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  INTRODUCTION   
In a Saturday Night Live sketch that aired during the 2016 
Democratic Presidential primaries, a town hall questioner 
played by Seinfeld actress Julia Louis-Dreyfus asks “Bernie 
Sanders” how he plans to break up the banks. Sanders, por-
trayed by Seinfeld creator Larry David, responds, “Once I’m 
elected President, I’ll have a nice schvitz in the White House 
gym, then I’ll go to the big banks, I’ll sit them down, and yada, 
yada, yada, they’ll be broken up.”1 
This sketch illustrates an important paradox: everyone dis-
likes big banks, but no one knows what to do about them. Bernie 
Sanders is perhaps the best-known big bank critic, but he is far 
from alone. Indeed, policymakers as diverse as Elizabeth War-
ren, John McCain, Newt Gingrich, and even President Donald 
Trump have called for shrinking the largest financial firms.2 In 
 
 1. Saturday Night Live: Brooklyn Democratic Debate Cold Open (NBC tel-
evision broadcast Apr. 16, 2016), https://www.nbc.com/saturday-night-live/ 
video/brooklyn-democratic-debate-cold-open/3021115 [https://perma.cc/X8QV 
-5SLK]. After Louis-Dreyfus protests that Sanders “yada yada’d over the best 
part,” Sanders replies, “No, I mentioned the schvitz.” Id. The exchange parodies 
the famous Seinfeld episode, “The Yada.” Seinfeld: The Yada (NBC television 
broadcast Apr. 24, 1997), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
3CKyWu87W78 [https://perma.cc/EJ8C-Z3UD]. 
 2. See Donna Borak, Warren, McCain Push for Return of Glass-Steagall, 
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fact, both the Democratic and Republican parties endorsed 
breaking up the banks in their policy platforms for the 2016 elec-
tion.3 
This apparent consensus in favor of breaking up the banks 
stems, in large part, from a perception that some U.S. financial 
institutions are “too big to manage” (TBTM). A financial institu-
tion is TBTM if its size prevents executives, board members, and 
shareholders from effectively overseeing the firm, leading to ex-
cessive risk-taking and misconduct.4 Officials from both the 
Obama and Trump Administrations have cited the TBTM prob-
lem as a catalyst for the 2008 financial crisis.5 On this view, 
many of the largest U.S. financial companies collapsed because 
stakeholders were unable to monitor the firms’ risk profiles.  
The TBTM problem differs from another common critique of 
large financial institutions: that they are too big to fail. Critics 
allege that the U.S. government bailed out major financial com-
panies—including Bank of America, Citigroup, and American 
International Group—because these firms were so large that 
they would have threatened the broader financial system had 
 
AM. BANKER (July 11, 2013), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/warren 
-mccain-push-for-return-of-glass-steagall; Dan Freed, Gingrich Would Break 
Up Big Banks, THE STREET (Nov. 14, 2011), https://www.thestreet.com/story/ 
11309884/1/gingrich-would-break-up-big-banks.html [https://perma.cc/LT2T 
-WPMZ]; Akane Otani & Ryan Tracy, President Trump Says He’s Looking into 
Breaking Up Wall Street Banks, WALL ST. J. (May 1, 2017), https://www.wsj 
.com/articles/president-trump-says-hes-looking-into-breaking-up-wall-street 
-banks-1493660319. 
 3. See DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM COMM., 2016 DEMOCRATIC PARTY PLAT-
FORM 10–11 (2016), https://democrats.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/2016_ 
DNC_Platform.pdf [https://perma.cc/SAT8-KAUB]; REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 
COMM., REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 2016 3, 28 (2016), https://prod-cdn-static.gop 
.com/media/documents/DRAFT_12_FINAL%5B1%5D-ben_1468872234.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/D4VG-2KLB]. 
 4. See Andrew Hill, When Is a Company Too Big to Manage?, FIN. TIMES 
(Feb. 27, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/87395500-bdd2-11e4-8cf3 
-00144feab7de. 
 5. See Suzanne McGee, Financial Nominees Prove Just How Disconnected 
Trump Is From Reality, GUARDIAN (Jan. 21, 2017), https://www.theguardian 
.com/us-news/us-money-blog/2017/jan/21/trump-financial-picks-steve-mnuchin 
-wilbur-ross [https://perma.cc/3Z3R-SXSY] (quoting Commerce Secretary Wil-
bur Ross asserting that Wall Street banks were too big to manage before the 
crisis); Matthew Zeitlin, Why Tim Geithner Doesn’t Think Anybody Will Ever 
Forgive Him, BUZZFEED NEWS (May 22, 2014), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/ 
article/matthewzeitlin/why-tim-geithner-doesnt-think-anybody-will-ever 
-forgive-him [https://perma.cc/5GLJ-SBAJ] (quoting former Treasury Secretary 
Tim Geithner acknowledging the TBTM problem). 
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they failed.6 After the crisis, the Dodd-Frank Act created a new 
liquidation process that, in theory, would allow the government 
to wind down a major financial conglomerate with minimal sys-
temic consequences.7 While some skeptics question whether this 
mechanism will work in practice,8 proponents contend that 
Dodd-Frank’s liquidation authority alleviates the too-big-to-fail 
problem.9 Because Dodd-Frank does not shrink the size of the 
largest financial institutions, however, many commentators 
agree that the TBTM problem persists.10 
 
 6. See, e.g., Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and 
Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 993–
1014 (2011); see also Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: 
The Government’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 474 
(2009) (explaining the “too-big-to-fail” phenomenon).  
 7. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-
Frank) Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 204, 124 Stat. 1376, 1454 (2010) (codified at 
12 U.S.C. § 5384 (2012)). 
 8. See, e.g., Peter Conti-Brown, Elective Shareholder Liability, 64 STAN. L. 
REV. 409, 421–23 (2012) (asserting that Dodd-Frank increases the likelihood of 
future bailouts); John Crawford, “Single Point of Entry”: The Promise and Lim-
its of the Latest Cure for Bailouts, 109 NW. UNIV. L. REV. ONLINE 103, 110–12 
(2014) (expressing skepticism that the new Orderly Liquidation Authority 
(OLA) will work as intended); Howell E. Jackson & Stephanie Massman, The 
Resolution of Distressed Financial Conglomerates, 3 RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. 
SOC. SCI. 48, 51–56 (2017) (explaining the challenges of implementing the OLA 
regime); Roberta S. Karmel, An Orderly Liquidation Authority Is Not the Solu-
tion to Too-Big-to-Fail, 6 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 1, 6 (2011) (discussing 
problems with the OLA regime); Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 
GEO. L.J. 435, 439 (2011) (asserting that bailouts are inevitable in modern econ-
omies); Stephen J. Lubben & Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Too Big and Unable to 
Fail, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1205, 1223–43 (2017) (discussing shortcomings of the 
OLA); Steven L. Schwarcz, Beyond Bankruptcy: Resolution as a Macropruden-
tial Regulatory Tool, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 709, 718–19 (2018) (questioning 
OLA’s efficacy); David Zaring, A Lack of Resolution, 60 EMORY L.J. 97, 138–53 
(2010) (proposing improvements to OLA). See generally Thomas W. Merrill & 
Margaret L. Merrill, Dodd-Frank Orderly Liquidation Authority: Too Big for the 
Constitution?, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 165 (2014) (raising constitutional objections to 
the OLA). 
 9. See, e.g., Lindsay Dunsmuir & Ann Saphir, Fed Chair Nominee Powell 
Sees No Too-Big-to-Fail Banks, REUTERS (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.reuters 
.com/article/us-usa-fed-powell-banks/fed-chair-nominee-powell-sees-no-too-big-
to-fail-banks-idUSKBN1DS260 [https://perma.cc/949W-3PQG] (quoting Fed-
eral Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell asserting that post-crisis reforms have 
eliminated the too-big-to-fail problem). 
 10. See, e.g., BARTLETT COLLINS NAYLOR, TOO BIG: THE MEGA-BANKS ARE 
TOO BIG TO FAIL, TOO BIG TO JAIL, AND TOO BIG TO MANAGE 45–46 (2016); Ben 
W. Heineman, Jr., Too Big to Manage: JP Morgan and the Mega Banks, HARV. 
BUS. REV. (Oct. 3, 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/10/too-big-to-manage-jp-morgan 
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Despite this apparent consensus, policymakers have not set-
tled on a solution to the TBTM issue. Scholars, legislators, and 
think tanks have proposed various strategies to break up the 
banks.11 Some big bank critics, for example, would institute a 
size limit on U.S. financial institutions.12 Others favor reinstat-
ing the Glass-Steagall Act, which would force financial conglom-
erates to separate their banking and nonbanking operations.13 
Still others support a “soft break-up,” in which stricter regula-
tions would incentivize TBTM firms to shrink.14 To date, how-
ever, none of these reforms has garnered significant political 
support, and prospects for future legislative action are dim.15 
In the meantime, the largest U.S. financial conglomerates 
have grown even bigger since the financial crisis. JPMorgan and 
Bank of America, for example, are more than fifty percent larger 
today than they were in 2007.16 Scandal-ridden Wells Fargo, 
meanwhile, has more than tripled in size.17 Amidst this unprec-
edented growth, JPMorgan’s $6 billion London Whale trading 
 
-and-the-mega-banks [https://perma.cc/THT2-KDEK]; Christine Wang, Wells 
Fargo Is ‘Too Big to Regulate, Manage,’ Says Trade Group CEO, CNBC (Sept. 
14, 2016), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/09/14/wells-fargo-is-too-big-to-regulate 
-manage-says-trade-group-ceo.html [https://perma.cc/7ZUR-PPV7]. 
 11. For simplicity, this Article uses the term “bank” to refer to both a com-
mercial bank and its parent holding company. Where relevant, the Article will 
distinguish between a bank holding company (BHC) and its subsidiary bank. 
 12. These proposals would cap a financial institution’s assets or liabilities 
at a specific dollar amount or as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). 
See infra Part II.B.1. 
 13. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 14. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 15. See infra Part II.A; see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Narrow Banking: 
An Overdue Reform that Could Solve the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem and Align 
U.S. and U.K. Regulation of Financial Conglomerates, 31 BANKING & FIN. SER-
VICES. POL’Y REP. 1, 2 (2012) (“[I]t seems highly unlikely—especially in light of 
megabanks’ enormous political clout—that Congress could be persuaded to 
adopt such draconian limits . . . .”). 
 16. Compare JPMorgan Chase & Co., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 69 
(Aug. 9, 2007), and Bank of Am. Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 4 (Aug. 8, 
2007), with JPMorgan Chase & Co., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 88 (Oct. 31, 
2018), and Bank of Am. Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 56 (Oct. 29, 2018) 
(showing that JPMorgan’s assets increased from $1.46 trillion to $2.62 trillion 
and Bank of America’s assets increased from $1.53 trillion to $2.34 trillion be-
tween June 30, 2007 and September 30, 2018). 
 17. Compare Wells Fargo & Co., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 40 (Aug. 8, 
2008), with Wells Fargo & Co., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 71 (Nov. 6, 2018) 
(showing that Wells Fargo’s total assets increased from $609 billion to $1.87 
trillion between June 30, 2008 and September 30, 2018). 
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loss, Wells Fargo’s fraudulent accounts scandal, and other mis-
conduct by big banks have added urgency to solving the TBTM 
problem.18 
This Article presents the first scholarly analysis of the 
TBTM issue.19 It asserts that big banks face unique governance 
challenges—including extreme opacity, run risk, and weak mar-
ket discipline—that expose these institutions to excessive risk-
taking and misconduct.20 Despite these managerial impedi-
ments, however, TBTM banks will not voluntarily break them-
selves up because they benefit from implicit government subsi-
dies unavailable to smaller firms.21 Thus, while there are many 
reasons to believe that some banks are TBTM, there is little rea-
son to trust that banks will solve the issue on their own. A public 
policy response is therefore necessary to fix the TBTM problem. 
This Article contends that existing proposals to solve the 
TBTM problem suffer from critical shortcomings. Breaking up 
all of the largest U.S. financial institutions could have detri-
mental unintended consequences. Once broken up, for example, 
JPMorgan, Citigroup, and other U.S. firms might struggle to 
 
 18. See Jeremy C. Kress, Board to Death: How Busy Directors Could Cause 
the Next Financial Crisis, 59 B.C. L. REV. 877, 904–13 (2018) (discussing JPMor-
gan’s London Whale trading losses and Wells Fargo’s fraudulent accounts scan-
dal). 
 19. To be sure, scholars have analyzed other aspects of the “too big” prob-
lem. Some contend that banks remain “too big to fail.” See, e.g., Roberta S. Kar-
mel, Is the Public Utility Holding Company Act a Model for Breaking Up the 
Banks That Are Too-Big-to-Fail?, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 821, 837–43 (2011); Charles 
W. Murdock, The Big Banks: Background, Deregulation, Financial Innovation, 
and “Too Big to Fail,” 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 505, 546–51 (2012); Saule T. Oma-
rova, The “Too Big to Fail” Problem, 103 MINN. L. REV. 2495, 2499–504 (2019); 
Mark J. Roe, Structural Corporate Degradation Due to Too-Big-to-Fail Finance, 
162 U. PA. L. REV. 1419, 1428–29 (2014); Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 6, at 963–
80. Others assert that banks are “too big to jail.” See, e.g., Jerry W. Markham, 
Regulating the “Too Big to Jail” Financial Institutions, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 517, 
565–69 (2018); Nizan Geslevich Packin, Breaking Bad? Too-Big-to-Fail Banks 
Not Guilty as Charged, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1089, 1092–94 (2014). Still other 
scholars maintain that banks are “too big to supervise.” See, e.g., Lev Menand, 
Too Big to Supervise: The Rise of Financial Conglomerates and the Decline of 
Discretionary Oversight in Banking, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 1527, 1583 (2018). To 
date, however, scholars have largely neglected the managerial aspects of the 
“too big” problem. 
 20. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 21. See infra Part I.B.3. 
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compete with their larger international counterparts.22 Simi-
larly, shrinking the banks could reduce economies of scale, mak-
ing large financial institutions—and the broader financial sys-
tem—less efficient.23 Moreover, if policymakers were to reinstate 
the Glass-Steagall Act, financial institutions might become less 
diversified and, thus, less stable.24 In sum, even if it were politi-
cally possible, breaking up all large U.S. banks could create more 
problems than it solves. 
This Article proposes a better solution to the TBTM prob-
lem. It recommends that financial regulators use their existing 
statutory authorities to require that a financial conglomerate di-
vest operations when it falls out of compliance with minimum 
regulatory standards. Regulators could use these authorities to 
compel a troubled financial conglomerate to sell certain subsidi-
aries, spin them off to shareholders as separately capitalized 
companies, or shutter them entirely. Regulators might, for ex-
ample, order Wells Fargo to divest its scandal-plagued wealth 
management unit or notoriously troubled Deutsche Bank to 
cease its U.S. banking operations.25 
Forced divestitures are better than other plans to break up 
the banks for four reasons. First, the threat of such a significant 
sanction would increase financial conglomerates’ incentives to 
 
 22. See, e.g., Steve Henn, Officials Fear Systemic Risks of Bailout, MARKET-
PLACE (Oct. 21, 2009), https://www.marketplace.org/2009/10/21/business/fallout 
-financial-crisis/officials-fear-systemic-risks-bailout/ [https://perma.cc/283L 
-N993] (statement of Harvard Law School Professor Hal Scott) (“[I]f we break 
up our banks and Europe doesn’t break up theirs and the Chinese don’t break 
up theirs, this is going to have an immense impact on who are the players in 
the international banking system.”). 
 23. See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF 
SIZE AND COMPLEXITY OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ON CAPITAL MARKET EFFI-
CIENCY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 9 (2016) [hereinafter 2016 FSOC REPORT] 
(“The preponderance of evidence from empirical studies . . . seems to be con-
sistent with the notion that financial institutions are characterized by econo-
mies of scale.”). 
 24. See Jonathan R. Macey & James P. Holdcroft, Jr., Failure Is an Option: 
An Ersatz-Antitrust Approach to Financial Regulation, 120 YALE L.J. 1368, 
1411 (2011). 
 25. See generally Emily Glazer, Whistleblowers Detail Wells Fargo Wealth 
Management Woes, WALL ST. J. (July 27, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
whistleblowers-detail-wells-fargo-wealth-management-woes-1532707096 (dis-
cussing allegations of illegal sales practices in Wells Fargo’s wealth manage-
ment business); Jenny Strasburg & Ryan Tracy, Deutsche Bank’s U.S. Opera-
tions Deemed Troubled by Fed, WALL ST. J. (June 1, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/deutsche-banks-u-s-operations-deemed-troubled-by-fed-1527768310 
(discussing Deutsche Bank’s long-standing regulatory problems). 
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operate prudently. Second, divestitures would safeguard the 
broader financial system by reducing the systemic footprint of 
banks that fail to comply with minimum regulatory require-
ments. Third, in contrast to more draconian break-up proposals, 
targeted divestitures would affect relatively few firms and 
thereby preserve economies of scale and scope for most financial 
conglomerates. Finally, unlike some politically infeasible break-
up plans, no new legislation is required because Congress has 
already authorized regulators to mandate divestitures under ex-
isting law. 
The financial regulatory agencies, in fact, have several un-
derutilized authorities empowering them to order divestitures.26 
The most promising of these authorities permits the Federal Re-
serve to compel a poorly managed financial conglomerate to dis-
continue its nonbanking subsidiaries. Historically, bank holding 
companies (BHCs) have been limited to engaging in traditional 
banking and closely related activities, such as taking deposits 
and making loans.27 In 1999, however, Congress authorized a 
new type of BHC—called a financial holding company (FHC)—
to engage in an expanded range of financial activities, including 
investment banking and insurance underwriting.28 To become 
an FHC and engage in these activities, a BHC and its subsidiary 
banks must be well capitalized and well managed, as measured 
by an annual supervisory examination.29 Under section 4(m) of 
the Bank Holding Company Act (BHC Act), if an FHC ceases to 
be well capitalized and well managed, the Federal Reserve may 
order it to divest its nonbanking subsidiaries.30 
The Federal Reserve has never exercised its divestiture au-
thority under section 4(m), despite many opportunities. Indeed, 
nearly forty percent of large FHCs do not currently satisfy the 
well-managed requirement to continue engaging in nonbanking 
activities.31 The Federal Reserve has not publicly explained why 
 
 26. See infra Part III.B. 
 27. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2) (2012) (authorizing BHCs to engage in bank-
ing activities); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (authorizing BHCs to engage in 
activities that are “so closely related to banking as to be a proper incident 
thereto”). 
 28. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4). 
 29. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1843(j)(4)(A)–(B), (l)(1). 
 30. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(m). 
 31. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., SUPERVISION AND 
REGULATION REPORT 15 (2018) [hereinafter SUPERVISION AND REGULATION RE-
PORT]. It is unlikely, however, that the Federal Reserve would need to compel 
all of these FHCs to divest their nonbanking operations. Faced with the threat 
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it declines to enforce section 4(m). This Article asserts that the 
agency’s longstanding neglect of section 4(m) has become a self-
fulfilling prophecy. Because the Federal Reserve has not invoked 
section 4(m) in more than twenty years, the agency now risks 
that its first use of section 4(m) will be perceived as arbitrary.32  
This Article urges the Federal Reserve to exercise its section 
4(m) power in appropriate circumstances, and it proposes a 
framework to put this authority into practice. This Article rec-
ommends that the Federal Reserve adopt a regulation requiring 
an FHC to divest its nonbanking operations if it fails to comply 
with the well-capitalized or well-managed requirements for 
more than two years. By implementing a regulation through no-
tice-and-comment rulemaking, the Federal Reserve would com-
bat perceptions of arbitrariness when it ultimately exercises its 
section 4(m) authority. Moreover, by increasing incentives for 
FHCs to comply with regulatory requirements, and by breaking 
up FHCs that fail to do so, this divestiture framework could help 
solve the TBTM problem. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the origins 
of TBTM banks and assesses how their vast size impedes effec-
tive management, as demonstrated by several high-profile ex-
amples. Part II then evaluates three prominent proposals to 
break up TBTM financial institutions—capping banks’ asset 
size, reinstating Glass-Steagall, and incentivizing a “soft break-
up.” It concludes that each proposal is politically infeasible and, 
in any event, could suffer from unintended consequences. Part 
III introduces divestitures as a better way to solve the TBTM 
problem. It reviews financial regulators’ existing authorities to 
require divestitures, and it argues that section 4(m) of the BHC 
Act is the most compelling of these authorities. Part IV proposes 
a novel framework for the Federal Reserve to put its section 4(m) 
divestiture authority into practice. Finally, Part V responds to 
anticipated objections. 
I.  THE TBTM PROBLEM   
The 2008 financial crisis demonstrated unequivocally that 
some U.S. financial institutions have become too big to manage 
prudently. This Part examines the problem of TBTM financial 
 
of a significant sanction, firms would invest in improving their risk manage-
ment and corporate governance. The Federal Reserve, in turn, would upgrade 
the supervisory status of firms for which a divestiture sanction would be unnec-
essary. See infra Part V.A. 
 32. See infra Part III.C.1. 
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conglomerates. Section I.A begins by reviewing how some U.S. 
financial companies became TBTM. Section I.B then analyzes 
why large financial conglomerates might be susceptible to mis-
management. Finally, Section I.C assesses how the TBTM prob-
lem contributed to excessive risk-taking and misconduct during 
and after the financial crisis through brief case studies of Amer-
ican International Group (AIG), JPMorgan, and Wells Fargo. 
A. ORIGINS OF THE TBTM PROBLEM 
U.S. banks have not always been as large as they are today. 
To the contrary, TBTM financial conglomerates are a relatively 
recent phenomenon, with many firms growing dramatically 
within the past half-century.33 This rapid consolidation occurred 
in three distinct phases, as banks took advantage of relaxed ge-
ographic restrictions, loosened activities prohibitions, and crisis-
era mergers.34 This Section traces the evolution of U.S. banks 
from single branch offices to multinational conglomerates. 
1. The Demise of Geographic Restrictions 
Until the mid-twentieth century, U.S. banks were subject to 
onerous geographic restrictions that effectively limited their 
size. Congress prohibited national banks from branching, and 
many states prevented state-chartered banks from opening more 
than one office.35 Even in states that allowed intra-state branch-
ing, inter-state branching was impermissible.36 When bank own-
ers began to form BHCs to acquire control of multiple banks—
and thereby evade branching restrictions—Congress forbade a 
BHC from acquiring an interstate bank absent statutory author-
ization from the target bank’s home state.37 No state adopted the 
requisite authorizing legislation.38 Thus, for much of the early 
 
 33. See Hubert P. Janicki & Edward Simpson Prescott, Changes in the Size 
Distribution of U.S. Banks: 1960–2005, 92 FED. RES. BANK OF RICHMOND ECON. 
Q. 291, 293 fig.2 (2006). 
 34. See MICHAEL S. BARR ET AL., FINANCIAL REGULATION: LAW AND POLICY 
54–58, 714–15, 726–29 (2d ed. 2018). 
 35. Christian A. Johnson & Tara Rice, Assessing a Decade of Interstate 
Bank Branching, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 73, 79–80 (2018) (noting that the 
Comptroller of the Currency interpreted the National Bank Act to prohibit 
branching by national banks); see id. at 80 (discussing restrictions on state bank 
branching). 
 36. See BARR ET AL., supra note 34, at 42. 
 37. See Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, § 3(d), 70 
Stat. 133, 135 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (2012)). 
 38. BARR ET AL., supra note 34, at 717. 
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part of the twentieth century, many U.S. banks operated as sin-
gle offices, effectively precluding them from doing business be-
yond their local communities.39 
These geographic restrictions prevented banks from becom-
ing excessively large. Indeed, even the biggest U.S. banks had, 
at most, several billion dollars of assets in the mid-twentieth 
century.40 Table 1 lists the largest U.S. banking organizations by 
asset size as of 1940.41 
 




Assets as %  
of U.S. 
GDP 
Chase National Bank  $3.82  3.7% 
National City Bank of New York  $3.10  3.0% 
Guaranty Trust Company of 
New York 
$2.72  2.6% 
Bank of America National Trust $1.82  1.8% 
Continental Illinois National 
Bank & Trust 
$1.62 1.6% 
Bankers Trust Company $1.58 1.5% 
TOTAL OF TOP SIX FIRMS $14.66 14.2% 
 
Gradually, however, the states and the federal government 
began to liberalize their branching restrictions. The McFadden 
Act granted a national bank the same right to branch within its 
home state as a state-chartered bank located in that state.42 It 
was not until the 1970s, though, that states started to permit 
 
 39. See id. at 714 (describing so-called “unit banks”). 
 40. For data on U.S. banking organizations’ asset size as of 1940, see 
MOODY’S INV’R SERVS., MOODY’S MANUAL OF INVESTMENTS, AMERICAN AND 
FOREIGN a72–a77 (1941). 
 41. Id. at a72. Comparing a bank’s total assets relative to its home country’s 
GDP is a standard method for measuring a bank’s size. See BARR ET AL., supra 
note 34, at 13. U.S. GDP in 1940 was $102.9 billion. Table 1.1.5 Gross Domestic 
Product, BUREAU ECON. ANALYSIS https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm? 
reqid=19&step=2#reqid=19&step=2&isuri=1&1921=survey [perma.cc/352k 
-4VKY] [hereinafter BUREAU ECON. ANALYSIS]. 
 42. See McFadden Act, Pub. L. No. 69-639, § 7, 44 Stat. 1224, 1228 (1927) 
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 36(c)(2) (2012)). 
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interstate branching and acquisitions, thereby authorizing in-
terstate banking for national and state banks.43 Even then, how-
ever, some states impeded interstate banking by imposing con-
ditions on out-of-state entrants or limiting the activities of out-
of-state banks.44 
Eventually, in 1994, the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and 
Branching Efficiency Act (Riegle-Neal) eliminated the remain-
ing barriers to interstate banking, giving rise to a new tier of 
regional banks.45 Riegle-Neal permitted national and state 
banks to branch across state lines and BHCs to acquire out-of-
state subsidiary banks, subject to regulatory approval.46 As a re-
sult, banks began consolidating with other firms in neighboring 
states. In the late 1990s, for example, California-based Wells 
Fargo & Co. merged with Minnesota-based Norwest Corp., while 
Wachovia Corp. extended its reach from North Carolina into Vir-
ginia by acquiring Central Fidelity Banks Inc.47  
These mergers resulted in a thriving tier of regional banks 
that were considerably larger than the single-office banks that 
 
 43. See BARR ET AL., supra note 34, at 726. 
 44. See id. 
 45. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, 
Pub. L. No. 103-238, 108 Stat. 2338. For background on Riegle-Neal, see gener-
ally Patrick Mulloy & Cynthia Lasker, The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and 
Branching Efficiency Act of 1994: Responding to Global Competition, 21 J. 
LEGIS. 255 (1995). 
 46. 12 U.S.C. §§ 215a-1(a), 1831u(a), 1842(d) (2012). Riegle-Neal author-
ized a bank to branch interstate only through merger—i.e., by acquiring an out-
of-state branch. Riegle-Neal did not permit a bank to establish an interstate 
branch de novo, and most states continued to prohibit de novo branching by out-
of-state banks. Eventually, in 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act removed this final bar-
rier to interstate branching. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 613, 124 Stat. 1376, 1614 (2010) (codified 
in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
 47. Eleena De Lisser, Wachovia to Spend $2.3 Billion to Buy Central Fidel-
ity Banks, WALL ST. J. (June 25, 1997), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB867158156259951000; Matt Murray, Norwest, Wells Fargo Agree to Form 
Banking Giant in $31.4 Billion Pact, WALL ST. J. (June 9, 1998), https://www 
.wsj.com/articles/SB897306023976625000. This era also featured several signif-
icant intrastate mergers, including Chase Manhattan’s merger with Chemical 
Banking in New York and BankAmerica Corp.’s purchase of Security Pacific in 
California. See James Bates, BankAmerica Takes Over at Security Pacific, L.A. 
TIMES (Apr. 22, 1992), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1992-04-22-fi 
-633-story.html [https://perma.cc/2DXM-EXZT]; Saul Hansell, Chase and 
Chemical Agree to Merge in $10 Billion Deal Creating Largest U.S. Bank, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 29, 1995), https://www.nytimes.com/1995/08/290/us/banking-s-new 
-giant-deal-chase-chemical-agree-merge-10-billion-deal-creating.html. 
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predominated during the era of geographic restrictions. The 
largest U.S. banking organizations as of 1997 are listed in  
Table 2.48 
 
Table 2: Largest U.S. Banking Organizations (1997) 
Name 
Asset Size  
($ Billions) 
Assets as %  
of U.S. GDP 
Chase Manhattan  $365.5 4.3% 
Citicorp  $310.9 3.6% 
Bank of America Corp. $264.6 3.1% 
J.P. Morgan  $262.2 3.1% 
Wachovia Corp.  $157.3 1.8% 
Bankers Trust Corp. $140.1 1.6% 
TOTAL OF TOP SIX FIRMS $1,500.6 17.5% 
2. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
A second phase of financial sector consolidation followed in 
the early 2000s, giving rise to even larger and more diversified 
financial conglomerates. This era is notable because commercial 
banks grew not only in scale but also in scope, expanding into 
investment banking, insurance, and other new activities. 
In 1999, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act reversed decades-long 
prohibitions against BHCs engaging in nonbanking activities.49 
Historically, BHCs had been limited to taking deposits, making 
loans, and engaging in “closely related” activities, such as invest-
ment advising and asset management.50 The Depression-era 
Glass-Steagall Act, for example, barred commercial banks from 
engaging in investment banking, including securities underwrit-
ing and dealing.51 Similar laws precluded banks from providing 
 
 48. A Database of 50 Years of Fortune’s List of America’s Largest Corpora-
tions, FORTUNE (1998), http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/ 
fortune500_archive/assets/1998/ [https://perma.cc/96DD-VDPK]. U.S. GDP in 
1997 was $8.6 trillion. BUREAU ECON. ANALYSIS, supra note 41. 
 49. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 103, 113 Stat. 1338, 
1342–51 (1999) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (2012)). 
 50. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8); 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.28(a)–(b) (2019) (listing ac-
tivities considered to be “so closely related to banking . . . as to be a proper inci-
dent thereto”). 
 51. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, § 20, 48 Stat. 162, 188–89 (1933) 
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 377) (repealed 1999). 
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insurance.52 But after years of lobbying, Congress lifted these re-
strictions in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, permitting a new cat-
egory of BHCs—called FHCs—to engage in an expanded range 
of financial activities, including investment banking, insurance, 
and merchant banking.53 
Congress stipulated that to qualify as an FHC and be eligi-
ble to engage in this full panoply of financial activities, a firm 
must meet heightened regulatory standards.54 Specifically, the 
holding company and all its bank subsidiaries must be both “well 
capitalized” and “well managed.”55 Thus, only companies with 
high capital ratios and supervisory examination ratings may be-
come and remain FHCs.56 These standards were intended to en-
sure that only strong, well-run firms would be permitted to en-
gage in potentially risky financial activities.57 
Within the next four years, all of the United States’ largest 
BHCs became FHCs and took advantage of this new authority to 
expand into nonbanking activities.58 Many of them did so by 
merger. The most notable such combination—between Citicorp, 
a BHC, and Travelers, an insurance company—actually pre-
 
 52. See BARR ET AL., supra note 34, at 698–99 (discussing the 1966 amend-
ments to the BHC Act and Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982). 
 53. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 103, 113 Stat. 1338, 
1342 (1999). Some commentators contend that a series of deregulatory admin-
istrative and judicial interpretations throughout the late twentieth century ef-
fectively overturned the Glass-Steagall Act’s activities restrictions even before 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley passed. See, e.g., Karmel, supra note 8, at 11–22; Arthur 
E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Road to Repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, 17 WAKE FOREST 
J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 441, 449–91 (2017).  
 54. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(1). 
 55. Id. Originally, Gramm-Leach-Bliley required only that the holding com-
pany’s subsidiary depository institutions be well capitalized and well managed. 
See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 103. The Dodd-Frank Act, however, added the 
additional requirement that the holding company itself be well capitalized and 
well managed. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 606(a), 124 Stat. 
1376, 1607 (2010). 
 56. For more discussion of the well-capitalized and well-managed require-
ments, see infra Part III.C. 
 57. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-434, at 151–56 (1999) (Conf. Rep.) (discussing 
standards for engaging in expanded financial activities). 
 58. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. & U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON FINANCIAL HOLDING COMPANIES UN-
DER THE GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT 2–3 (2003) [hereinafter FINANCIAL HOLD-
ING COMPANY REPORT]. 
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dated Gramm-Leach-Bliley and put significant pressure on Con-
gress to retroactively authorize the merger by passing the Act.59 
Within a year after the Act, commercial bank Chase Manhattan 
Corp. acquired investment bank J.P. Morgan & Co., creating the 
second-largest financial services conglomerate, behind only 
Citigroup.60 Meanwhile, large U.S. insurance companies like 
MetLife and investment banks like Charles Schwab & Co. be-
came FHCs and acquired commercial bank subsidiaries.61 
In large part due to this unprecedented nonbanking expan-
sion, the largest U.S. financial conglomerates more than tripled 
in size between the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and 
the beginning of the financial crisis in the mid-2000s.62 Table 3 
depicts the largest U.S. banking organizations as of 2007.63 
 
Table 3: Largest U.S. Banking Organizations (2007) 
Name 
Asset Size  
($ Billions) 
Assets as %  
of U.S. GDP 
Citigroup, Inc. $2,187 15.1% 
Bank of America Corp. $1,721 11.9% 
JPMorgan Chase & Co. $1,562 10.8% 
Wachovia Corp. $783 5.4% 
Wells Fargo & Co. $575 4.0% 
U.S. Bancorp $238 1.6% 
TOTAL OF TOP SIX FIRMS $7,066 48.9% 
 
 59. See Lissa L. Broome & Jerry W. Markham, Banking and Insurance: Be-
fore and After the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 25 J. CORP. L. 723, 757 (2000); Ar-
thur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Citigroup: A Case Study in Managerial and Regulatory 
Failures, 47 IND. L. REV. 69, 73 (2014).  
 60. See Patrick McGeehan & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Chase Manhattan to Ac-
quire J.P. Morgan for $30.9 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2000), https://archive 
.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/learning/teachers/featured_articles/ 
20000914thursday.html [https://perma.cc/YVY9-8UXR]. 
 61. See FINANCIAL HOLDING COMPANY REPORT, supra note 58, at 3. 
 62. The growth of U.S. financial institutions was also partially attributable 
to mergers between regional banks. For instance, Bank of America agreed to 
merge with FleetBoston in 2003, followed by JPMorgan merger agreement with 
Bank One a few months later. See Riva D. Atlas, Bank of America and Fleet-
Boston Agree to Merger, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2003, at A1; Andrew Ross Sorkin, 
$58 Billion Deal to Unite 2 Giants of U.S. Banking, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2004, 
at A1.  
 63. For data on U.S. banking organizations’ asset size as of 2007, see NAT’L 
INFO. CTR., BHC PEER GROUP DATA (2007), https://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/ 
content/BHCPRRPT/REPORTS/BHCPR_PEER/Dec2007/PeerGroup_1_ 
December2007.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ZY8-WEWX]. U.S. GDP in 2007 was 
$14.5 trillion. See BUREAU ECON. ANALYSIS, supra note 41. 
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3. Crisis-Era Acquisitions 
The most recent phase of bank expansion occurred during 
the financial crisis, when the government relied on relatively 
healthy banks to acquire failing firms and thereby stabilize the 
financial system. This wave of crisis-induced, government-as-
sisted mergers created the megabanks that dominate the U.S. 
financial system today.64 
As the financial system spiraled into chaos in 2008, the fed-
eral government eagerly encouraged a handful of comparatively 
strong banks to absorb weaker institutions that were teetering 
on the brink of insolvency. As a result, the acquiring institutions 
ballooned dramatically in size. Wells Fargo, for example, more 
than doubled its asset base by merging with troubled Wachovia 
in a hastily-arranged deal.65 JPMorgan overtook Citigroup to be-
come the largest U.S. banking organization by virtue of its gov-
ernment-assisted acquisitions of Bear Stearns, the fifth-biggest 
U.S. investment bank, and Washington Mutual, the largest U.S. 
savings and loan association.66 Bank of America likewise added 
Merrill Lynch, the third-largest U.S. investment bank, and 
Countrywide Financial, the biggest U.S. mortgage originator, 
growing by hundreds of billions of dollars in assets in the pro-
cess.67 Perversely, therefore, the financial crisis—which was ar-
guably caused by extremely large banks—resulted in substan-
tially bigger banks.68 
 
 64. See, e.g., NAT’L INFO. CTR., BHC PEER GROUP DATA (2018), https://www 
.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/content/BHCPRRPT/REPORTS/BHCPR_PEER/ 
June2018/BHCPR_PeerGrp1_20180630.pdf [https://perma.cc/69GJ-S82T] (il-
lustrating the expansive size of the largest banks in 2018). 
 65. See David Enrich & Dan Fitzpatrick, Wachovia Chooses Wells Fargo, 
Spurns Citi, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122303190029501925 
(last updated Oct. 4, 2008, 11:59 PM). 
 66. See Rob Curran, J.P. Morgan Rises 10% on Takeover of Bear; Broker 
MF Global Plummets 65%; Lehman Sinks 19%, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2008, at 
C8; Robin Sidel et al., WaMu is Seized, Sold Off to J.P. Morgan, in Largest Fail-
ure in U.S. Banking History, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB122238415586576687 (last updated Sept. 26, 2008). 
 67. See Gretchen Morgenson & Eric Dash, Troubled Giant in Home Loans 
Close to Rescue, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2008, at A1; Jonathan Stempel & Elinor 
Comlay, Bank of America Takeover to End Independent Merrill, REUTERS (Sept. 
14, 2008, 9:08 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-merrill-bankofamerica/ 
bank-of-america-takeover-to-end-independent-merrill 
-idUSN1445019920080915 [https://perma.cc/5REF-CY9J]. 
 68. See, e.g., Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: 
Financial Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 
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Since the crisis, the largest U.S. banks have only continued 
to grow. Post-crisis regulations intended to discourage systemi-
cally important banks from expanding have not stopped this 
trend. To the contrary, U.S. megabanks have dramatically out-
paced their smaller rivals in attracting deposits.69 Thus, due to 
their crisis-era acquisitions and continued organic growth, 
JPMorgan and Bank of America have more than doubled in 
size—and Wells Fargo has tripled—since the onset of the finan-
cial crisis.70 Table 4 depicts the largest U.S. banking organiza-
tions as of 2018.71 
 
Table 4: Largest U.S. Banking Organizations (2018) 
Name 
Asset Size  
($ Billions) 
Assets as % 
of U.S. GDP 
JPMorgan Chase & Co. $2,590 12.5% 
Bank of America Corp. $2,292 11.1% 
Citigroup Inc. $1,912 9.3% 
Wells Fargo & Co. $1,880 9.1% 
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. $969 4.7% 
Morgan Stanley $876 4.2% 
TOTAL OF TOP SIX FIRMS $10,519 50.9% 
 
 
CONN. L. REV. 963, 968, 1002 (2009) (arguing that large, diversified banks trig-
gered the crisis). Moreover, investment banks Goldman Sachs and Morgan 
Stanley—which had previously avoided Federal Reserve regulation by virtue of 
an exemption in the BHC Act—opted to become BHCs to access the Federal 
Reserve’s discount window. See Jon Hilsenrath et al., Goldman, Morgan Scrap 
Wall Street Model, Become Banks in Bid to Ride Out Crisis, WALL ST. J., 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122202739111460721 (last updated Sept. 22, 
2008, 11:59 PM). For an illustration of the post-crisis expansion of bank hold-
ings, compare NAT’L INFO. CTR., BHC PEER GROUP DATA (2007), supra note 63, 
with NAT’L INFO. CTR., BHC PEER GROUP DATA (2018), supra note 64. 
 69. See Rachel Louise Ensign, Biggest Three Banks Gobble Up $2.4 Trillion 
in New Deposits Since Crisis, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/biggest 
-three-banks-gobble-up-2-4-trillion-in-new-deposits-since-crisis-1521711001 
(last updated Mar. 22, 2018, 7:16 PM) (noting that JPMorgan, Bank of America, 
and Wells Fargo accounted for forty-five percent of U.S. checking accounts 
opened in 2017). 
 70. See Matt Egan, Too-Big-to-Fail Banks Keep Getting Bigger, CNN (Nov. 
21, 2017, 3:43 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2017/11/21/investing/banks-too-big 
-to-fail-jpmorgan-bank-of-america/index.html [https://perma.cc/T75Q-JZAQ]. 
 71. For more comprehensive data on U.S. banking organizations’ asset size 
as of 2018, see NAT’L INFO. CTR., BHC PEER GROUP DATA (2018), supra note 64. 
U.S. GDP in 2018 was $20.7 trillion. BUREAU ECON. ANALYSIS, supra note 41. 
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B. EXPLANATIONS FOR THE TBTM PROBLEM 
The dramatic growth of the largest U.S. banks over the past 
half-century has important implications for how these firms gov-
ern themselves. At baseline, banks pose unique managerial chal-
lenges because they are more opaque, riskier, and less suscepti-
ble to market discipline than most nonfinancial firms. 
Governance of the largest banks is especially difficult because 
size exacerbates each of these managerial impediments. As a re-
sult, big banks are susceptible to excessive risk-taking and mis-
conduct. Nonetheless, the TBTM problem persists because 
shareholders lack both the incentive and ability to force large 
banks to reduce risks or break themselves up. 
1. Impediments to Effective Bank Governance 
All banks, regardless of size, face significant managerial 
challenges. Banks are unusually opaque, risky, and insulated 
from market discipline, relative to nonfinancial firms. These 
three characteristics, in turn, impede effective bank governance. 
First, opacity—or information asymmetries between a 
bank’s risk takers and its other stakeholders—can prevent man-
agement from effectively overseeing the firm’s risk profile. Given 
the numerous transactions in which banks engage on a daily ba-
sis, it may not be possible for managers to identify and effectively 
mitigate the bank’s risk exposures.72 Although financial institu-
tions have developed sophisticated risk management and report-
ing techniques to enhance managerial oversight, risk takers at 
the firm may nonetheless cause significant losses by the time 
management detects a problem.73 Opacity can be particularly 
 
 72. See Gerard Caprio, Jr. & Ross Levine, Corporate Governance in Fi-
nance: Concepts and International Observations, in FINANCIAL SECTOR GOV-
ERNANCE: THE ROLES OF THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS 17, 29–35 (Robert 
E. Litan et al. eds., 2002) (discussing the opacity problem in banking); see also 
Luc Laeven, Corporate Governance: What’s Special About Banks?, 5 ANN. REV. 
FIN. ECON. 63, 67 (2013) (“[B]anks are more opaque than the typical nonfinan-
cial firms because of large informational asymmetries surrounding loan qual-
ity . . . . Trading activities may also make banks more opaque than nonfinancial 
companies without such activities . . . because trading positions and associated 
risk profiles can be easily changed in real time.”). 
 73. This is exactly what happened at JPMorgan, for example, when a rogue 
trader dubbed the “London Whale” amassed an outsized stake in volatile credit 
derivatives before being detected by the firm’s risk management function. The 
London Whale trades cost JPMorgan more than $6 billion in losses. See STAFF 
OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 113TH CONG., JPMORGAN 
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problematic when a bank’s compensation structure incentivizes 
employees to take excessive risks.74  
Second, the inherent riskiness of a bank’s highly leveraged 
capital structure creates unique management challenges. In con-
trast to many nonfinancial firms, banks fund themselves over-
whelmingly with debt, rather than equity.75 Much of this debt is 
short-term, in the form of deposits and other runnable instru-
ments, which creditors can withdraw with little warning.76 This 
combination of high leverage and short-term funding provides 
bank managers a relatively small margin for error. Even a minor 
drop in a bank’s asset values or loss of funding can quickly lead 
to insolvency. 
Third, banks are shielded from some forms of market disci-
pline that could otherwise improve corporate governance. A non-
financial firm’s creditors typically exert some level of control 
over the company’s management by entering into debt covenants 
or by declining to roll over their loans if the firm becomes too 
risky.77 Creditors insist on these protections to increase the like-
lihood that the firm will be able to repay its debts, and this mar-
ket discipline can lead to better managerial oversight and more 
appropriate risk-taking.78 However, a bank’s most significant 
 
CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES 2, 
94 (Comm. Print 2013) [hereinafter SENATE JPMORGAN REPORT]. 
 74. Cf. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 
98 GEO. L.J. 247, 255–74 (2010) (discussing bankers’ incentives to take exces-
sive risks). For further discussion of the problem of compensation structures in 
financial institution corporate governance, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporate 
Governance and Executive Compensation in Financial Firms: The Case for Con-
vertible Equity-Based Pay, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 834, 848–50 (2012). 
 75. See Kose John et al., Corporate Governance in Banks, 24 CORP. GOV-
ERNANCE 303, 304 (2016) (“[T]he average leverage of banks, measured as the 
ratio of debt to assets, is between [eighty-seven] and [ninety-five] percent, 
whereas the average leverage of nonfinancial companies is in the range of 20–
30 percent.” (internal citation omitted)); Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, 
The Corporate Governance of Banks, 9 FED. RESERVE BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y 
REV. 91, 97 (2003) (“Although it is not uncommon for typical manufacturing 
firms to finance themselves with more equity than debt, banks typically receive 
ninety percent or more of their funding from debt.”).  
 76. See Laeven, supra note 72, at 67 (internal citation omitted) (“[M]uch of 
the debt held by banks is short-term, whereas assets tend to be longer-dated. 
Such maturity transformation exposes banks to liquidity risk and bank 
runs . . . .”). 
 77. See Caprio & Levine, supra note 72, at 22. 
 78. See Charles K. Whitehead, Creditors and Debt Governance, in RE-
SEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 68, 70 (Claire A. 
Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012). 
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creditors—its depositors—generally lack incentive to monitor 
the bank because they are insured by the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation (FDIC).79 This is the classic moral hazard prob-
lem in banking: depositors do not effectively discipline a bank’s 
management because depositors know that the FDIC will shield 
them from losses the bank might incur. The bank, knowing that 
its creditors will not discipline it, therefore takes greater risks.80  
In sum, banks of all sizes experience significant governance 
challenges because of their distinctive characteristics. Opacity, 
high leverage, and lack of market discipline—features that are 
endemic to the banking business model—undermine the effec-
tive management of these institutions.  
2. Unique Governance Challenges for TBTM Banks 
Although banks of all sizes face managerial challenges, 
these difficulties are especially pronounced for large firms. In-
deed, size intensifies all three major impediments to effective 
bank governance.  
First, larger banks are, by their nature, more opaque than 
smaller firms. Simply put, it is harder for executives, directors, 
and shareholders to know what is going on inside a bank with 
250,000 employees, compared to a bank with 250 employees. 
Moreover, larger BHCs tend to have numerous subsidiaries 
spanning multiple regulatory jurisdictions, increasing their or-
ganizational complexity and information asymmetries.81 The 
opacity and complexity of larger BHCs therefore inhibits effec-
tive managerial oversight. 
 
 79. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1) (2012) (providing that FDIC shall insure de-
positors up to $250,000 per ownership account category, per depositor, per in-
stitution). 
 80. See, e.g., Christopher M. Bruner, Corporate Governance Reform in a 
Time of Crisis, 36 J. CORP. L. 309, 311–12 (2011); Harris Weinstein, Moral Haz-
ard Deposit Insurance and Banking Regulation, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1099, 
1101–02 (1992). 
 81. See LINDA GOLDBERG & APRIL MEEHL, STAFF REP. NO. 880, FED. RE-
SERVE BANK OF N.Y., COMPLEXITY IN LARGE U.S. BANKS 3–4 (2019) (using in-
dustry codes and geographic distribution of subsidiaries to measure a BHC’s 
complexity); Nicola Cetorelli et al., Evolution in Bank Complexity, 20 FED. RE-
SERVE BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. 85, 104–05 (2014); Mark D. Flood et al., The 
Complexity of Bank Holding Companies: A Topological Approach 33–49 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23755, 2017) (assessing a BHC’s 
complexity relative to the number and geographic distribution of its subsidiar-
ies).  
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These managerial challenges, in fact, have strong grounding 
in organizational behavior theory. Social scientists have docu-
mented that executives experience a “loss of control” as their or-
ganizations grow and become more complex.82 That is, subordi-
nates can only accomplish a portion of their supervisors’ wishes, 
and they only communicate a fraction of their knowledge to their 
supervisors. As a result, both managerial control and infor-
mation transmission diminish as the hierarchies within an or-
ganization expand.83 The loss of control phenomenon helps ex-
plain why a multinational financial conglomerate may be more 
susceptible to misconduct or excessive risk-taking than a smaller 
bank. 
Second, larger banks are riskier than smaller competitors. 
In practice, large banks rely more on short-term wholesale fi-
nancing like repurchase agreements, securities lending, and de-
rivatives compared to smaller banks, which fund themselves pri-
marily with deposits.84 This heavy reliance on short-term 
financing poses unique managerial challenges for large banks 
because wholesale financing is not as “sticky” as deposit fund-
ing.85 Short-term financing tends to evaporate quickly during a 
crisis, as the financial sector experienced in 2008.86 Thus, big 
bank executives have an especially narrow margin for error. 
Finally, larger banks suffer from even weaker market disci-
pline than smaller firms. Banks of all sizes have some unsecured 
creditors and uninsured depositors who are not explicitly pro-
tected by the FDIC’s safety net, with its $250,000 limit.87 These 
 
 82. See Oliver E. Williamson, Hierarchical Control and Optimum Firm 
Size, 75 J. POL. ECON. 123, 127–30 (1967); see also Guillermo A. Calvo & Stani-
slaw Wellisz, Supervision, Loss of Control, and the Optimum Size of the Firm, 
86 J. POL. ECON. 943, 943–44 (1978). 
 83. Williamson, supra note 82, at 123 (“[T]he larger . . . the organization, 
the better the chance that its top decision-makers will be operating in purely 
imaginary worlds.”). 
 84. See, e.g., Thomas M. Hoenig, Community Banks and the Federal Re-
serve, 88 ECON. REV. 5, 8 (2003) (“[S]mall banks are more heavily dependent on 
retail deposits for their funds than large banks.”). 
 85. See, e.g., DONG BEOM CHOI & HYUN-SOO CHOI, STAFF REP. NO. 759, 
FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., THE EFFECT OF MONETARY POLICY ON WHOLE-
SALE FUNDING 2 (2017). 
 86. See Paolo Saguato, The Liquidity Dilemma and the Repo Market: A 
Two-Step Policy Option to Address the Regulatory Void, 22 STAN. J.L. BUS. & 
FIN. 85, 106–11 (2017) (analyzing short-term funding markets during the 2008 
financial crisis). 
 87. The FDIC insures a depositor up to $250,000 per ownership account 
category, per institution. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1) (2012). 
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unprotected creditors should have an interest in overseeing the 
bank’s risk profile to ensure the bank can repay its debts. But 
unsecured and uninsured creditors of banks that are perceived 
as “too big to fail” lack this incentive. That is because creditors 
of the very biggest banks believe that the government would bail 
them out if such an institution were to fail.88 That is exactly what 
happened in the 2008 financial crisis, when the FDIC guaran-
teed all deposits above the deposit insurance limit even though 
they were not protected by an explicit guarantee ex ante.89 This 
implicit government guarantee persists even after Dodd-Frank. 
Although the statute purported to end the too-big-to-fail problem 
through the creation of a new resolution authority to safely wind 
down failing firms, the biggest banking organizations continue 
to borrow at unusually low rates, suggesting that creditors view 
anti-bailout pledges as non-credible.90 Accordingly, even unse-
cured and uninsured depositors lack appropriate incentives to 
discipline managers of the largest banks. 
In sum, big banks face unique corporate governance chal-
lenges. Large financial firms are especially opaque, risky, and 
insulated from market discipline. These impediments are the 
root of the TBTM problem that too often exposes big banks to 
misconduct and excessive risk-taking. 
 
 88. See BARR ET AL., supra note 34, at 256–57. For a thorough discussion of 
the limitations of market discipline in banking, see generally David Min, Un-
derstanding the Failures of Market Discipline, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1421 (2015). 
 89. See BARR ET AL., supra note 34, at 983–84. Moreover, the Federal Re-
serve’s emergency loans to save AIG and facilitate the acquisition of Bear 
Stearns have been characterized as bailouts of those firms’ unsecured long-term 
creditors. See, e.g., Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or 
Bailouts?, 35 J. CORP. L. 469, 485–86 (2010) (asserting that bailouts granted un-
secured creditors greater relief than would have been awarded in bankruptcy). 
 90. See, e.g., Bhanu Balasubramnian & Ken B. Cyree, Has Market Disci-
pline Improved After the Dodd-Frank Act?, 41 J. BANKING & FIN. 155, 165 (2014) 
(concluding that Dodd-Frank reduced, but did not eliminate, implicit govern-
ment subsidies for firms perceived as too big to fail); Viral V. Acharya et al., The 
End of Market Discipline? Investor Expectations of Implicit Government Guar-
antees 30–33 (Munich Personal RePEc Archive, Working Paper No. 79700, 
2016) (finding that Dodd-Frank did not significantly reduce investors’ expecta-
tions for government bailouts of large financial firms); see also U.S. GOV’T AC-
COUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-621, LARGE BANK HOLDING COMPANIES: EX-
PECTATIONS OF GOVERNMENT SUPPORT (2014), https://www.gao.gov/assets/ 
670/665162.pdf [https://perma.cc/NL44-PMG6] [hereinafter EXPECTATIONS OF 
GOVERNMENT SUPPORT] (suggesting implicit government subsidies may result 
in lower funding costs in some models).  
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3. TBTM Banks Will Not Break Themselves Up 
In light of these governance challenges, one might expect 
TBTM banks to break themselves up voluntarily. In theory, 
shareholders should have strong incentives to shrink a TBTM 
bank to ensure that it operates prudently.91 But this does not 
happen in practice. In fact, TBTM banks will not break them-
selves up for three reasons. 
First, as discussed above, a bank perceived as “too big to fail” 
benefits from an implicit government subsidy that would be un-
available if the firm were to shrink itself to a more manageable 
size.92 Banks believed to be “too big to fail” borrow relatively 
cheaply because creditors expect that the government would not 
let such a firm collapse, fearing risks to the broader financial 
system.93  By some estimates, this implicit subsidy reached more 
than 600 basis points in the lead-up to the financial crisis.94 
While the magnitude of the subsidy has diminished since the cri-
sis, big banks continue to enjoy a funding advantage over 
smaller firms.95 Shareholders of a TBTM bank may therefore be 
reluctant to lose that subsidy by breaking up the firm.96 
Second, even if shareholders wanted to break up a TBTM 
bank, they could face insurmountable legal obstacles. Banking 
laws deter shareholders from promoting significant corporate 
governance reforms and structural changes, such as a break-up. 
Under the BHC Act, a shareholder or association of shareholders 
who “directly or indirectly exercises a controlling influence over 
the management or policies” of a bank becomes subject to oner-
ous regulation as a BHC.97 The Federal Reserve has applied this 
provision stringently.98 While a minority shareholder may con-
sult with management about changes in the bank’s strategy, an-
ything more than that—for instance, coordinating with other 
shareholders or initiating a proxy contest—could constitute a 
 
 91. For a discussion of bank shareholders’ incentives and the increasing 
role of asset managers in bank governance, see Yesha Yadav, Too-Big-To-Fail 
Shareholders, 103 MINN. L. REV. 587, 631–37, 656–57 (2018).  
 92. See supra text accompanying notes 87–90. 
 93. See supra text accompanying notes 87–90. 
 94. See EXPECTATIONS OF GOVERNMENT SUPPORT, supra note 90, at 51.  
 95. See Acharya et al., supra note 90, at 35. 
 96. See Roe, supra note 19, at 1428–29. 
 97. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2)(C) (2012). 
 98. See Kress, supra note 18, at 922 n.266 (referencing instances in which 
the Federal Reserve has found a controlling influence). 
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“controlling influence.”99 These severe restrictions help explain 
why shareholder activism is less prevalent in banking than in 
other industries.100 
Finally, even if shareholders were willing and legally able to 
break up a TBTM bank, they would almost certainly meet stiff 
managerial resistance. Bank executives have strong incentives 
to oppose a break-up, since they would earn less compensation 
at a smaller institution.101 Moreover, a break-up would under-
mine executives’ well-documented motivations to “empire build” 
by continually growing their firms.102 Unsurprisingly, therefore, 
many top bank executives are on record as opposing break-
ups.103 Given executives’ ability to influence shareholder votes, 
managerial resistance would significantly reduce the likelihood 
of a TBTM bank breaking itself up voluntarily.104 
Collectively, the implicit government subsidy, legal obsta-
cles, and managerial resistance will deter shareholders from 
even attempting to break up a TBTM bank. Thus, while there 
are many reasons to believe that some banks are TBTM, there is 
little reason to trust that banks will solve the problem on their 
own. 
 
 99. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Policy State-
ment on Equity Investments in Banks and Bank Holding Companies 11–12 
(Sept. 22, 2008) https://www.federalreserve.gov/bcreg20080922b1.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/U59P-PH77] (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 225.144). 
 100. See, e.g., William Sweet, Shareholder Activism in the U.S. Banking In-
dustry, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 3, 2013), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/12/03/shareholder-activism-in-the-us 
-banking-industry/ [https://perma.cc/N94T-E44Z]. 
 101. See Murdock, supra note 19, at 548 (asserting that managerial re-
sistance is the “biggest barrier” to breaking up large banking organizations). 
 102. See, e.g., Ole-Kristian Hope & Wayne B. Thomas, Managerial Empire 
Building and Firm Disclosure, 46 J. ACCT. RES. 591, 592–93 (2008) (describing 
“the empire building” phenomenon). 
 103. See, e.g., Tom Braithwaite, Dimon Warns Breaking Up JPMorgan 
Would Hurt U.S. Financial Power, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2015), https://www.ft 
.com/content/7e907a18-9c04-11e4-a6b6-00144feabdc0 (discussing JPMorgan 
Chase CEO Jamie Dimon’s opposition to a break-up); Ben McLannahan & Bar-
ney Jopson, BofA’s Moynihan Calls Big Bank Break-Up ‘Crazy,’ FIN. TIMES 
(May 3, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/4c2422ca-3061-11e7-9555 
-23ef563ecf9a (describing Bank of America CEO Brian Moynihan’s resistance 
to breaking up the banks). 
 104. See, e.g., Fabrizio Ferri & David Oesch, Management Influence on In-
vestors: Evidence from Shareholder Votes on the Frequency of Say on Pay, 33 
CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 1337, 1339 (2016) (finding that a managerial recommen-
dation on a shareholder proposal shifts the votes of more than 25% of investors). 
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C. MANIFESTATIONS OF THE TBTM PROBLEM 
The TBTM problem manifested itself in several high-profile 
ways during and after the 2008 financial crisis. Some of the most 
significant crisis-era failures, such as AIG, were triggered by the 
TBTM problem.105 Even after the crisis, JPMorgan’s London 
Whale trading scandal and Wells Fargo’s fraudulent account 
scandal were at least partially attributable to the vast size of 
those firms. This Section assesses how the TBTM problem con-
tributed to misconduct and excessive risk-taking at AIG, JPMor-
gan, and Wells Fargo. A common theme emerges from these 
three narratives: each firm transgressed because of ineffective 
risk management, impeded by its massive size. 
1. AIG 
AIG’s rise and subsequent collapse epitomized TBTM fi-
nance in the lead-up to the 2008 financial crisis. Founded in the 
early twentieth century, AIG grew into the largest U.S. insur-
ance holding company with a focus on traditional life and health 
business lines.106 In 1998, however, AIG began issuing credit de-
fault swaps (CDS) through its Financial Products division.107 
These instruments guaranteed corporate debt and, eventually, 
mortgage-backed securities in exchange for a small fee.108 As the 
housing bubble inflated in the early 2000s, AIG earned steady 
profits on its CDS.109 At the same time, AIG invested collateral 
from securities lending counterparties in the booming mortgage-
backed securities market.110 When the housing bubble burst, 
however, AIG suffered massive liquidity strains. The firm’s CDS 
counterparties insisted that AIG post margin, and its securities 
 
 105. In addition to its substantial insurance operations, AIG operated a fed-
eral savings bank and was regulated as a savings and loan holding company by 
the Office of Thrift Supervision. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 
66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 988 (2009).  
 106. See id. at 944. For a compelling discussion of AIG’s historically con-
servative approach to insurance underwriting, see RODDY BOYD, FATAL RISK: A 
CAUTIONARY TALE OF AIG’S CORPORATE SUICIDE 53–54 (2011). 
 107. See THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY 
REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE 
FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 120 (2011) [hereinaf-
ter FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT]. 
 108. See id. at 140–41. 
 109. See id. at 140. 
 110. See Daniel Schwarcz & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk 
in Insurance, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1569, 1585–86 (2014). 
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lending counterparties demanded return of their collateral.111 
These claims were too much for AIG, which began to shed assets 
at fire sale prices to satisfy the mounting demands.112 Eventu-
ally, the U.S. government stepped in with an $85 billion 
bailout—which it later increased to more than $182 billion—to 
save AIG and its counterparties.113 
AIG’s massive size undoubtedly contributed to its epic col-
lapse. For years, AIG’s long-time CEO, Maurice “Hank” Green-
berg, famously monitored even the smallest risk exposures as 
the company grew into a $1 trillion conglomerate.114 When 
Greenberg departed in 2005, however, he left a company that 
was too big for his replacement, Martin Sullivan, to manage. Un-
der Sullivan’s watch, for example, AIG failed to implement effec-
tive valuation models for its CDS, despite warnings from its au-
ditor.115 Furthermore, it was during Sullivan’s tenure that AIG’s 
securities lending business started investing collateral in mort-
gage-backed securities.116 Because of AIG’s expansive size, how-
ever, its risk management systems and personnel did not detect 
the correlated risks building throughout its disparate business 
lines.117 As a Federal Reserve official would later conclude, Sul-
livan was “too removed from the activities on the ground to un-
derstand the risks.”118 In this way, AIG illustrates the potential 
 
 111. See id. 
 112. See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 107, at 347–49. 
 113. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Afterword to The AIG Bailout, 72 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 795, 796, 819 (2015). 
 114. See BOYD, supra note 106, at 63, 74–75 (discussing Greenberg’s over-
sight of AIG’s risk profile); Sjostrom, Jr., supra note 105, at 946 (describing 
AIG’s balance sheet). 
 115. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, JUNE OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE AIG RES-
CUE, ITS IMPACT ON MARKETS, AND THE GOVERNMENT’S EXIT STRATEGY 28 
(2010). 
 116. See id. at 33. 
 117. See id. at 36–38 (discussing AIG’s risk management deficiencies); see 
also Edward Simpson Prescott, Too Big to Manage? Two Book Reviews, 99 
ECON. Q. 143, 148 (2013) (“[U]nder the Sullivan regime, there is evidence that 
AIG’s senior management was unaware of the risks that AIGFP was actually 
taking.”). Professor Richard Squire asserts that AIG’s correlated risk-taking 
strategy was economically rational, from the perspective of AIG’s shareholders. 
See Richard Squire, Shareholder Opportunism in a World of Risky Debt, 123 
HARV. L. REV. 1151, 1183–91 (2010). The weight of the evidence, however, sug-
gests that AIG’s senior-most management did not fully appreciate the extent of 
the firm’s correlated risks. 
 118. Prescott, supra note 117, at 157. 
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danger of financial institutions that are so big and complex that 
key stakeholders cannot effectively oversee them. 
2. JPMorgan 
The TBTM problem, of course, outlasted the financial crisis, 
as JPMorgan’s London Whale trading losses vividly demon-
strated.119 Before the crisis, JPMorgan’s Chief Investment Office 
(CIO) hedged the firm’s macroeconomic risk exposures.120 In 
2012, however, the head of the CIO adopted a new strategy: the 
unit would attempt to generate windfall profits by buying and 
selling CDS.121 Embracing this new approach, a CIO trader—
later dubbed the “London Whale”—amassed huge positions in 
CDS indices.122 To facilitate his risk-taking, the trader and his 
associates deliberately mismarked their positions and cajoled 
the CIO’s management into changing the unit’s risk models.123 
The CDS market, however, quickly turned against JPMorgan. 
Within a few months, the London Whale’s trading positions suf-
fered steep losses, and the head of the CIO instructed the traders 
to stop trading.124 By the time JPMorgan wound down the Lon-
don Whale portfolio, the firm incurred $6.2 billion in losses and 
more than $1 billion in fines for inadequate risk monitoring.125 
Similar to AIG, JPMorgan’s vast size impaired the firm’s 
ability to detect and prevent trading losses. Most obviously, 
JPMorgan’s $2 trillion balance sheet obscured the London Whale 
exposures, allowing the CIO traders to amass their positions 
without attracting managerial or supervisory attention.126 More 
subtly, however, JPMorgan’s sprawling reach hid deficiencies in 
 
 119. For detailed discussions of the London Whale losses, see Jill E. Fisch, 
The Mess at Morgan: Risk, Incentives and Shareholder Empowerment, 83 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 651, 655–59 (2015); Kress, supra note 18, at 908–13; Hillary A. 
Sale, J.P. Morgan: An Anatomy of Corporate Publicness, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 
1629, 1636–39 (2014); Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Big Bank Boards: The Case 
for Heightened Administrative Enforcement, 68 ALA. L. REV. 1011, 1014–18 
(2017). 
 120. See SENATE JPMORGAN REPORT, supra note 73, at 21–22. 
 121. See id. at 220. 
 122. See id. at 228–40. 
 123. See id. at 261–70, 326–37. 
 124. See id. at 255–56. 
 125. See id. at 6; Fisch, supra note 119, at 654. 
 126. See SENATE JPMORGAN REPORT, supra note 73, at 18–19, (demonstrat-
ing how the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency failed to detect escalating 
risks in the CIO given JPMorgan Chase’s massive size). 
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CIO’s risk management. JPMorgan’s board of directors and sen-
ior executives, for example, permitted the CIO to operate with-
out a line-of-business chief risk officer, in contrast to all of 
JPMorgan’s other business lines.127 Likewise, JPMorgan’s lead-
ers were slow to address the fact that CIO’s senior-most risk of-
ficer reported directly to the head of the CIO, rather than to the 
firm-wide chief risk officer.128 This reporting structure tied CIO’s 
risk managers to the business line and enabled the CIO traders 
to influence the unit’s risk models.129 Thus, JPMorgan’s size and 
complexity not only hid the CIO’s CDS exposures, it also dis-
tracted the firm’s senior leaders from risk management deficien-
cies that, if corrected, could have prevented the London Whale 
trading losses. 
3. Wells Fargo 
Finally, Wells Fargo’s recent scandals demonstrate the po-
tential for TBTM financial institutions to harm their customers. 
In 2016, Wells Fargo settled charges that its employees opened 
more than 3.5 million unauthorized checking, savings, and credit 
card accounts to meet aggressive cross-selling goals.130 Wells 
Fargo eventually agreed to refund $142 million to customers who 
had accounts opened without their permission over a fifteen-year 
period.131 Critically, Wells Fargo’s misconduct was not limited to 
fraudulent bank accounts. To the contrary, Wells Fargo has set-
tled allegations that it illegally repossessed military members’ 
cars,132 charged auto loan borrowers for insurance without their 
knowledge,133 and improperly levied fees for extending mortgage 
 
 127. See id. at 187–90. 
 128. See id. at 342–45. 
 129. See id. 
 130. See Laura J. Keller, Wells Fargo Boosts Fake-Account Estimate 67% to 
3.5 Million, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2017-08-31/wells-fargo-increases-fake-account-estimate-67-to-3-5 
-million. 
 131. See Kartikay Mehrotra, Wells Fargo’s Fake Account Customers to Get 
‘Imperfect’ Closure, BLOOMBERG (May 30, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/2018-05-30/wells-fargo-s-fake-account-customers-to-get 
-imperfect-closure. 
 132. See Devlin Barrett & Emily Glazer, Wells Fargo Reaches Settlement 
Over Car Repossessions, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/wells-fargo-reaches-settlement-over-car-repossessions-1475173677. 
 133. See Renae Merle, Wells Fargo Says It Faces $1 Billion Penalty for Mort-
gage, Auto Business Misdeeds, WASH. POST (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2018/04/13/wells-fargo-says-it-faces-1 
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rate-locks.134 Moreover, press reports suggest that government 
investigators are looking into inappropriate conduct relating to 
Wells Fargo’s add-on products and wealth management ser-
vices.135 In response to this pervasive misconduct, the Federal 
Reserve imposed an unprecedented asset cap on Wells Fargo un-
til the company corrects its governance deficiencies.136 
Wells Fargo’s expansive size was at least partially responsi-
ble for its consumer abuses. The firm grew extremely rapidly 
during the financial crisis. As discussed above, Wells Fargo ac-
quired Wachovia, a company nearly fifty percent larger than it-
self.137 Wells Fargo’s governance and controls, however, were 
poorly equipped to handle this significant acquisition and subse-
quent organic growth. For example, a report commissioned by 
Wells Fargo’s independent directors concluded that the firm’s 
sprawling organizational structure inhibited effective risk man-
agement while the sales practice violations occurred.138 Wells 
Fargo’s directors and executives were unable to hold business-
line and risk managers accountable given its highly decentral-
ized structure.139 Even after Wells Fargo’s unauthorized ac-
counts came to light, the firm failed to prevent misconduct from 




 134. See id. 
 135. See Emily Glazer, Wells Fargo’s Latest Challenge: Refunds for Pet In-
surance, Legal Services, WALL ST. J. (July 19, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/wells-fargos-latest-challenge-refunds-for-pet-insurance-legal-services 
-1532009933; Emily Glazer, Wells Fargo’s Wealth Management Unit Attracts 
Justice Department Attention, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/wells-fargos-wealth-management-unit-attracts-justice-department 
-attention-1519920782. 
 136. See Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Respond-
ing to Widespread Consumer Abuses and Compliance Breakdowns by Wells 
Fargo, Federal Reserve Restricts Wells’ Growth Until Firm Improves Govern-
ance and Controls (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ 
pressreleases/enforcement20180202a.htm [https://perma.cc/FCV7-XYK9]. 
 137. See Enrich & Fitzpatrick, supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 138. INDEP. DIRS. OF THE BD. OF WELLS FARGO & CO., SALES PRACTICES IN-
VESTIGATION REPORT 8 (2017), https://www08.wellsfargomedia.com/assets/pdf/ 
about/investor-relations/presentations/2017/board-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
2GP5-SG52] (“Wells Fargo’s decentralized organizational structure and the def-
erence paid to the lines of business contributed to the persistence of this [sales-
driven] environment.”). 
 139. See id. at 13 (“[T]he culture of substantial deference accorded to the 
lines of business carried over into the control functions.”). 
 140. See supra notes 130–33. 
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In this way, therefore, Wells Fargo illustrates the potential 
threat that a TBTM financial institution’s excessive size could 
pose to its customers. 
In sum, the vast size of AIG, JPMorgan, and Wells Fargo 
prevented managers, directors, shareholders, and regulators 
from effectively overseeing these firms. To be sure, size alone did 
not cause these firms’ difficulties. But the companies’ unprece-
dented size exacerbated their complexity, internal control prob-
lems, and cultural issues.141 These examples are representative 
of widespread corporate governance deficiencies at the United 
States’ largest financial institutions, both before and after the 
financial crisis.142 The frequency of misconduct and excessive 
risk-taking among these firms underscores the urgency of solv-
ing the TBTM problem. 
II.  BARRIERS TO EXISTING BREAK-UP PROPOSALS   
Despite the gravity of the TBTM problem, policymakers 
have done little to address the issue. To be sure, policymakers 
from across the political spectrum acknowledge that the largest 
U.S. banks are too big.143 Some policymakers have even proposed 
legislation to rein in the size of these firms by capping banks’ 
asset size, reinstating the Glass-Steagall Act, or incentivizing a 
“soft break-up.” Nonetheless, policymakers have not coalesced 
around a viable solution to the TBTM problem. This Part as-
sesses two primary reasons why the United States has failed to 
address the TBTM issue. First, the most prominent proposals to 
break up the banks have faced insurmountable political barriers. 
Second, even if these break-up proposals were politically feasi-
ble, they could involve undesirable policy trade-offs. 
A. POLITICAL INFEASIBILITY 
The most significant shortcoming of existing break-up pro-
posals is that they have proven politically infeasible. Ostensibly, 
both major political parties acknowledge the TBTM problem and 
support breaking up large banks, according to their official plat-
forms.144 Despite this apparent bipartisan consensus, however, 
 
 141. See, e.g., Hilary J. Allen, The Pathologies of Banking Business as Usual, 
17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 861, 884–88 (2015) (analyzing how cultural issues contrib-
uted to JPMorgan’s London Whale losses). 
 142. See, e.g., Markham, supra note 19, at 523–64 (documenting misconduct 
by large financial institutions). 
 143. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 144. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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legislative initiatives to break up the banks have languished in 
Congress. Indeed, none of the break-up proposals currently 
pending before Congress has received a hearing or a committee 
vote.145 Even in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis, 
Democratic majorities in Congress declined to adopt meaningful 
limits on bank size as part of the Dodd-Frank Act.146 
Congress has not only failed to solve the TBTM problem, it 
has in fact made the problem worse. In early 2018, Congress 
adopted the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer 
Protection Act (EGRRCPA), the most significant financial re-
form legislation since Dodd-Frank.147 Although primarily fo-
cused on easing regulatory burdens for small and midsized 
banks, the legislation also weakened constraints on big banks. 
For example, EGRRCPA relaxed liquidity requirements for the 
largest firms, freeing them to hold fewer riskless assets.148 The 
legislation also gave the largest U.S. financial institutions a new 
legal tool to challenge capital, stress testing, and other risk-mit-
igating rules in court.149 EGRRCPA, in sum, compounded the 
TBTM problem. 
Policymakers’ failure to address the TBTM problem sug-
gests that breaking up the banks may be an effective campaign 
talking point, but in practice, there is insufficient political will 
to follow through. Breaking up the banks is popular among the 
electorate, with pluralities of both Democratic and Republican 
 
 145. For a discussion of the break-up proposals currently pending before 
Congress, see infra Part II.B. 
 146. See, e.g., Roll Call Vote 111th Congress—2nd Session, U.S. SENATE, 
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm? 
congress=111&session=2&vote=00136 [https://perma.cc/L576-PWVH] (reject-
ing an amendment to cap BHC size by 61-33 vote). 
 147. Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 115-174, 132 Stat. 1296 (2018).  
 148. See id. § 403; see also Manuela Tobias, Is the Senate Banking Bill a Big 
Win for Wall Street? Yes and No, POLITIFACT (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www 
.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2018/mar/20/heidi-heitkamp/senate 
-banking-bill-win-advantage-wall-street/ [https://perma.cc/6Q9Z-937T]. 
 149. See David Dayen, Revenge of the Stadium Banks, THE INTERCEPT (Mar. 
2, 2018), https://theintercept.com/2018/03/02/crapo-instead-of-taking-on-gun 
-control-democrats-are-teaming-with-republicans-for-a-stealth-attack-on-wall 
-street-reform/ [https://perma.cc/TE23-SWR9]; Jeremy Kress, Beware of the 
Bank Deregulation Trojan Horse, THE HILL (Feb. 7, 2018), https://thehill.com/ 
opinion/finance/372764-beware-of-the-bank-deregulation-trojan-horse [https:// 
perma.cc/5877-A9WV] (describing statutory language that large banks could 
use to challenge enhanced regulations). 
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voters supporting the idea.150 Candidates might therefore cam-
paign on breaking up the banks, even if they have little intention 
of pursuing a break-up once in office. Further, some observers 
contend that the divergence between legislators’ pro-break-up 
rhetoric and pro-bank policies is attributable to the financial sec-
tor’s considerable lobbying power.151 Whatever the reason for the 
divergence, recent experience demonstrates that policymakers 
lack the political will to break up the banks, despite rhetoric to 
the contrary.  
In sum, the political feasibility of breaking up the banks is 
dubious, at best. Both major political parties and their key lead-
ers purport to favor breaking up the banks. Yet legislative pro-
posals to break up the banks have stalled and, at the same time, 
Congress has actually weakened constraints on the largest 
banks. Even the strongest financial reform advocates therefore 
acknowledge that legislative efforts to break up the biggest 
banks are likely politically unrealistic.152 
B. SUBSTANTIVE SHORTCOMINGS 
Even setting politics aside, however, existing proposals to 
break up the banks involve undesirable policy trade-offs. This 
Section evaluates the three most prominent break-up pro-
posals—capping banks’ asset size, reinstating the Glass-Steagall 
Act, and incentivizing a “soft break-up.” It concludes that even if 
a break-up were politically possible, the economic costs of forcing 
all large U.S. financial institutions to shrink might, on net, ex-
ceed the benefits. 
1. Capping Banks’ Size 
Some big bank skeptics have proposed to solve the TBTM 
problem by limiting banks’ size. Under this relatively straight-
 
 150. See, e.g., Peter Schroeder, Poll: Bipartisan Backing for Breaking Up Big 
Banks, HILL (Jan. 20, 2015), https://thehill.com/policy/finance/230058-poll 
-bipartisan-backing-for-breaking-up-big-banks [https://perma.cc/945V-FHYD]. 
 151. See, e.g., Andrew Baker, Restraining Regulatory Capture? Anglo-Amer-
ica, Crisis Politics and Trajectories of Change in Global Financial Governance, 
86 INT’L AFF. 647, 651 (2010) (discussing lobbying by the financial sector); Kevin 
Young & Stefano Pagliari, Capital United? Business Unity in Regulatory Poli-
tics and the Special Place of Finance, 11 REG. & GOVERNANCE 3 (2015) (exam-
ining efficacy of financial sector lobbying).  
 152. See, e.g., Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 15, at 2 (2012) (“[I]t seems highly 
unlikely—especially in light of megabanks’ enormous political clout—that Con-
gress could be persuaded to adopt such draconian limits . . . .”). 
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forward approach, Congress would cap a BHC’s assets or liabili-
ties at a set dollar amount or a certain percentage of U.S. gross 
domestic product (GDP). Any BHC that exceeds the prescribed 
threshold would be required to break itself up. For example, Sen-
ator Bernie Sanders has sponsored legislation that would limit 
a BHC’s liabilities to 3% of U.S. GDP, or approximately $584 bil-
lion.153 Some academics would go much further. Professor Jona-
than Macey, for instance, has suggested capping a BHC’s liabil-
ities at $3 billion.154 By way of comparison, JPMorgan—the 
largest U.S. BHC—has $2.4 trillion in liabilities.155 
Proponents of capping bank size argue that if some banks 
are TBTM, the most logical response is to enact hard balance 
sheet limits and thereby prevent firms from growing too large.156 
As Professor Simon Johnson succinctly put it, “Our largest banks 
are too big to manage. We need to cap their assets.”157 On this 
reasoning, a bank’s executives, directors, and shareholders 
would be better able to monitor its risk profile if the firm’s bal-
ance sheet were subject to reasonable legal limits.158 Proponents 
insist that capping bank size would have additional benefits, be-
yond making banks easier to manage. For instance, limiting 
bank size could reduce the implicit government subsidy through 
which firms perceived as “too big to fail” borrow at artificially 
 
 153. Too Big to Fail, Too Big to Exist Act, S. 3542, 115th Cong. (2018). Sand-
ers’ proposal would limit a BHC’s “total exposures,” including its on-balance-
sheet liabilities and off-balance-sheet exposures—e.g., derivatives. A previous 
proposal by Senators Sherrod Brown and Tom Harkin would have capped a 
BHC’s non-deposit liabilities at 2% of U.S. GDP. See SAFE Banking Act of 2012, 
S. 3048, 112th Cong. (2012). 
 154. See Macey & Holdcroft, Jr., supra note 24, at 1404. More generously, 
Professors Simon Johnson and James Kwak have proposed capping bank size 
at four percent of U.S. GDP, or approximately $570 billion. See SIMON JOHNSON 
& JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FI-
NANCIAL MELTDOWN 214 (2010). 
 155. JPMorgan Chase & Co., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 88 (Oct. 31, 
2018). 
 156. The BHC Act imposes “soft limits” on a bank’s size. Under the Act, the 
Federal Reserve may not approve a merger or acquisition if the resulting BHC 
would have more than 10% of the total nationwide deposits or liabilities. 12 
U.S.C. §§ 1843(d)(1), 1852(b) (2012). These limitations, however, apply only 
when a BHC expands through merger or acquisition. The BHC Act does not 
prevent a BHC from growing organically above the 10% deposit or liability cap. 
 157. Simon Johnson, Keep It Simple, Stupid, SLATE (Oct. 28, 2012), https:// 
slate.com/business/2012/10/too-big-to-fail-our-banks-are-too-big-we-need-to 
-cap-their-assets.html [https://perma.cc/9U9F-R8TM]. 
 158. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
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low rates.159 Reducing this subsidy could, in turn, eliminate com-
petitive distortions by allowing smaller firms to compete on a 
level playing field.160 Further, subjecting firms to a hard size 
limit could mitigate the moral hazard problem and thereby con-
strain excessive risk-taking.161 
Despite these potential advantages, there are at least three 
important reasons to be cautious about imposing a hard limit on 
banking organizations’ balance sheets. First, although the em-
pirical evidence is somewhat mixed, the weight of the research 
suggests that banks experience economies of scale.162 In other 
words, larger banks may be more economically efficient than 
smaller banks, even ignoring the implicit “too-big-to-fail” sub-
sidy.163 Larger banks may be able to serve customers more effi-
 
 159. See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 154, at 218. 
 160. See id. at 218–19. 
 161. See CHAIRPERSON OF THE FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, STUDY 
OF THE EFFECTS OF SIZE AND COMPLEXITY OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ON CAP-
ITAL MARKET EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 12 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 
FSOC REPORT]. 
 162. See 2016 FSOC REPORT, supra note 23, at 9. 
 163. See, e.g., Joseph P. Hughes & Loretta J. Mester, Who Said Large Banks 
Don’t Experience Scale Economies? Evidence from a Risk-Return-Driven Cost 
Function, 22 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 559, 581–82 (2013) (finding evidence of 
scale economies unrelated to the too-big-to-fail subsidy for BHCs with more 
than $100 billion in assets); Anna Kovner et al., Do Big Banks Have Lower Op-
erating Costs?, 20 FED. RESERVE BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. 1, 22 (2014) (find-
ing an inverse relationship between U.S. BHC asset size and noninterest ex-
pense ratios, suggesting economies of scale); Diego Restrepo-Tobón et al., Obelix 
vs. Asterix: Size of US Commercial Banks and Its Regulatory Challenge, 48 J. 
REG. ECON. 125, 160 (2015) (concluding that most U.S. commercial banks with 
more than $1 billion in assets experience economies of scale); David C. Wheelock 
& Paul W. Wilson, The Evolution of Scale Economies in US Banking, 33 J. AP-
PLIED ECON. 16, 23–27 (2018) (finding that U.S. BHCs experienced increasing 
returns to scale between 2006 and 2015). But see Richard Davies & Belinda 
Tracey, Too Big to Be Efficient? The Impact of Implicit Subsidies on Estimates 
of Scale Economies for Banks, 46 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 219, 243–44 
(2014) (finding no evidence of economies of scale in BHCs with more than $50 
billion in assets after controlling for the too-big-to-fail subsidy); Guohua Feng & 
Xiaohui Zhang, Returns to Scale at Large Banks in the US: A Random Coeffi-
cient Stochastic Frontier Approach, 39 J. BANKING & FIN. 135, 144 (2014) (con-
cluding that 90% of U.S. commercial banks with more than $1 billion in assets 
do not experience economies of scale); Hulusi Inanoglu et al., Analyzing Bank 
Efficiency: Are “Too-Big-to-Fail” Banks Efficient?, in THE HANDBOOK OF POST 
CRISIS FINANCIAL MODELING 110, 113 (Emmanuel Haven et al. eds., 2016) 
(finding negative returns to scale among the fifty largest U.S. commercial 
banks).  
  
2019] TOO BIG TO MANAGE 205 
 
ciently because of advantages in information technology or be-
cause they can spread fixed costs over a larger revenue base.164 
While evidence of economies of scale is strong for most banks, 
the research does not clearly establish that increasing returns to 
scale extend to the very largest firms.165 Nonetheless, the data 
on economies of scale in banking suggest a cautious approach to 
breaking up the banks, because capping bank size could lead to 
a less efficient financial system overall. 
Second, capping bank asset size could hinder U.S. banks’ in-
ternational competitiveness. Multinational corporate clients 
currently rely on the largest U.S. financial institutions for com-
plex services including securities underwriting, cash manage-
ment, foreign exchange, and payment and clearing.166 Oppo-
nents of breaking up the banks contend that smaller banks 
cannot provide these services on a global scale.167 As a result, 
they claim, financial activity would migrate overseas if the 
United States were to limit the size of its banks.168 Even some of 
the strongest proponents of capping bank size concede that U.S. 
financial institutions might shift internationally if the United 
States broke up its banks and other countries did not.169 Thus, 
 
 164. See, e.g., 2011 FSOC REPORT, supra note 161, at 10; Kovner et al., supra 
note 163, at 2. 
 165. See Lawrence G. Baxter, Betting Big: Value, Caution and Accountabil-
ity in an Era of Large Banks and Complex Finance, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 
765, 808 (2012) (“The ultimate record [of economies of scale] is mixed, however, 
with very large banks (assets exceeding $500 billion) not doing nearly as well 
as their much smaller counterparts ($20 million to $100 billion in total as-
sets) . . . .”). Compare Restrepo-Tobón et al., supra note 163, at 128 (concluding 
that commercial banks with more than $500 billion in assets generally do not 
experience economies of scale), with Wheelock & Wilson, supra note 163, at 26 
(finding evidence of increasing returns to scale for BHCs with more than $1 
trillion in assets). 
 166. See BUS. ROUNDTABLE, BUSINESS ON BANKING: HOW LARGE U.S. FI-
NANCIAL INSTITUTIONS HELP COMPANIES CREATE GROWTH AND OPPORTUNITY 
FOR AMERICA 5–12 (2013). 
 167. See THE CLEARING HOUSE, UNDERSTANDING THE ECONOMICS OF LARGE 
BANKS 41 (2011). 
 168. See Henn, supra note 22 (statement of Harvard Law School Professor 
Hal Scott); see also Peter J. Wallison, Breaking Up the Big Banks: Is Anybody 
Thinking?, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. 2 (Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.aei.org/ 
publication/breaking-up-the-big-banks-is-anybody-thinking/ [https://perma.cc/ 
E2SH-95KB]. 
 169. See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 154, at 217–18 (acknowledging that 
breaking up U.S. banks could affect international competition but insisting that 
U.S. nonfinancial companies could access financial services from smaller U.S. 
banks or foreign banks). 
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capping bank asset size could impair the U.S. financial system 
and, by extension, the broader U.S. economy. 
Finally, despite its intuitive appeal, capping bank size 
would be a crude solution to the TBTM problem because it ig-
nores other risk factors that exacerbate managerial challenges. 
Although bank size may be the dominant cause of the TBTM 
phenomenon, factors like complexity and interconnectedness no 
doubt contribute to a bank’s governance difficulties.170 Thus, it 
might be the case that a $2 trillion “plain vanilla” bank that only 
takes deposits and makes consumer loans is easier to manage 
than a $250 billion financial conglomerate that deals in compli-
cated securitizations and derivatives.171 Capping bank size, how-
ever, is a risk-insensitive approach that does not account for the 
range of factors that contribute to the TBTM problem. 
In sum, while capping bank size could mitigate the TBTM 
problem, this approach might have the unintended consequence 
of reducing economic efficiency and impairing U.S. banks’ inter-
national competitiveness. Moreover, to the extent that other fac-
tors like complexity and interconnectedness exacerbate a bank’s 
governance challenges, limiting the bank’s size would not com-
pletely solve the TBTM issue. Accordingly, it is not clear that the 
benefits of capping bank size would necessarily outweigh the 
costs. 
2. Reinstating the Glass-Steagall Act 
As an alternative to breaking up the banks based on their 
size, some scholars and policymakers have proposed breaking 
them up based on their activities. Specifically, some financial re-
form advocates support reinstating the Glass-Steagall Act, re-
turning to the pre-Gramm-Leach-Bliley era when commercial 
banks were prohibited from affiliating with other financial com-
panies. If the United States were to reinstate Glass-Steagall, 
therefore, all FHCs would be required to divest their investment 
 
 170. See Lawrence G. Baxter, Götterdämmerung, 19 N.C. BANKING INST. 91, 
97 n.20 (2013). 
 171. For detailed discussions of potential risks in securitization, see Patricia 
A. McCoy et al., Systemic Risk Through Securitization: The Result of Deregula-
tion and Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1327, 1366–73 (2009); Steven L. 
Schwarcz, The Future of Securitization, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1313, 1317–24 (2009); 
Dov Solomon, The Rise of a Giant: Securitization and the Global Financial Cri-
sis, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 859, 871–89 (2012); Matthew C. Turk, Securitization Re-
form After the Crisis: Regulation by Rulemaking or Regulation by Settlement?, 
37 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 861, 870–74 (2018). 
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bank and insurance subsidiaries and to cease other activities im-
permissible for regular BHCs. In Congress, Senators Elizabeth 
Warren, John McCain, and Angus King introduced bipartisan 
legislation that would reinstate Glass-Steagall.172 In academia, 
Professors Arthur Wilmarth and Ganesh Sitaraman have like-
wise called for returning to pre-Gramm-Leach-Bliley activities 
restrictions.173 
Proponents argue that reinstating Glass-Steagall would 
have several salutary effects. First, they contend that separating 
banking from other financial activities would reduce the size of 
the largest U.S. financial firms and thereby mitigate the TBTM 
problem.174 De-linking commercial and investment banking, for 
example, would shrink some of the biggest FHCs by close to fifty 
percent.175 Moreover, Glass-Steagall advocates insist that sepa-
rating financial conglomerates’ various business lines would re-
duce their complexity, making financial firms easier to manage 
and regulate.176 Finally, proponents contend that reviving Glass-
Steagall would reduce market concentration in the financial sec-
tor, thereby enhancing competition and reducing the financial 
sector’s political influence.177 
Like capping bank size, however, reinstating Glass-Steagall 
could involve undesirable trade-offs. Most significantly, separat-
ing commercial banking from other financial activities could per-
versely increase risk in the financial system.178 Economic theory 
predicts that diversified financial institutions will be more stable 
 
 172. See 21st Century Glass-Steagall Act of 2017, S. 881, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 173. See Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 6, 1034–52 (2011) (describing proposal to 
limit nonbanking activities by banks and their affiliates); Ganesh Sitaraman, 
The Case for Glass-Steagall Act, the Depression-Era Law We Need Today, 
GUARDIAN (June 16, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/ 
jun/16/case-glass-steagall-act-ganesh-sitaraman  
[https://perma.cc/D7Y9-BJZA].  
 174. See, e.g., Tamar Frankel, Dismantling Large Bank Holding Companies 
for Their Own Good and for the Good of the Country, 32 BANKING & FIN. SERVS. 
POL’Y REP. 12, 18 (2013) (“Breaking up BHCs into their unique services allows 
for a far more effective management . . . .”). 
 175. See Brian Cheung & Razi Haider, In Calls to Revive Glass-Steagall, Pol-
icy and Politics Square Off, S&P GLOBAL MKT. INTELLIGENCE (Oct. 18, 2016), 
http://m.bankingexchange.com/images/Dev_SNL/102716_GlassSteagall.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/7L2S-73KT]. 
 176. See Frankel, supra note 174, at 18; Sitaraman, supra note 173. 
 177. See Frankel, supra note 174, at 18–19; Sitaraman, supra note 173. 
 178. See Macey & Holdcroft, Jr., supra note 24, at 1411. 
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than highly concentrated firms.179 Consistent with this theory, 
empirical research confirms that diversified financial companies 
are less prone to income shocks and thus more resilient over 
time.180 For example, when a financial conglomerate experiences 
a downturn in commercial banking, stable investment banking 
or insurance revenues might mitigate its losses. In fact, that is 
exactly what happened during the 2008 financial crisis, when 
diversified financial conglomerates outperformed pure invest-
ment or commercial banks.181 Had these conglomerates been 
prohibited from diversifying into other financial activities, they 
might have collapsed and further exacerbated the crisis.182 Re-
instating Glass-Steagall could therefore reduce the financial sys-
tem’s resilience. 
Moreover, breaking up financial conglomerates by activity 
could eliminate synergies among various financial services. 
Some empirical evidence suggests that financial conglomerates 
benefit not only from economies of scale, but also economies of 
scope. That is, some research indicates that a financial conglom-
erate may provide a range of services—from commercial loans to 
merger-and-acquisition advising and cash management—more 
efficiently than individual firms offering those services sepa-
rately.183 The data are not conclusive, however, and a sizeable 
 
 179. See, e.g., Peter S. Rose, Diversification of the Banking Firm, 24 FIN. 
REV. 251, 251 (1989) (“Diversification of banks and bank holding companies into 
nonbank product lines may reduce the risk to banking returns or cash flows 
provided appropriate portfolio conditions are satisfied.”). 
 180. See 2011 FSOC REPORT, supra note 161, at 17 (“[M]ost of the empirical 
literature suggests that diversification . . . reduce[s] institutions’ individual 
probability of failure . . . .”); see also Rose, supra note 179, at 260 (finding evi-
dence of diversification benefits in financial services); William K. Templeton & 
Jacobus T. Severiens, The Effect of Nonbank Diversification on Bank Holding 
Company Risk, 31 Q.J. BUS. & ECON. 3, 9 (1992) (concluding that diversification 
into nonbank activities reduces BHC riskiness). But see Arthur E. Wilmarth, 
Jr., Too Big to Fail, Too Few to Serve? The Potential Risks of Nationwide Banks, 
77 IOWA L. REV. 957, 986–90 (1992) (contending that diversification has fre-
quently failed to yield benefits predicted by economic theory). 
 181. See, e.g., William M. Isaac & Richard M. Kovacevich, The Shattered Ar-
guments for a New Glass-Steagall, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.wsj 
.com/articles/the-shattered-arguments-for-a-new-glass-steagall-1493160658. 
 182. See James A. Fanto, “Breaking Up Is Hard to Do”: Should Financial 
Conglomerates Be Dismantled?, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 553, 578 (2011). 
 183. Most of the evidence of economies of scope focuses on the European fi-
nancial sector. See, e.g., Yener Altunbas & Phil Molyneux, Economies of Scale 
and Scope in European Banking, 4 APPLIED FIN. ECON. 367, 371–72 (1996) 
(finding positive economies of scope in some Spanish, German, and French 
banks); Mark Dijkstra, Economies of Scale and Scope in the European Banking 
  
2019] TOO BIG TO MANAGE 209 
 
body of research refutes evidence of economies of scope in finan-
cial services.184 Nonetheless, there is at least some support for 
the view that financial services clients may be better off when 
they can go to a diversified conglomerate as a “one stop shop” for 
all of their financial service needs.185 In sum, separating com-
mercial banking from investment banking, insurance, and other 
financial activities could conceivably reduce consumer welfare 
and overall economic efficiency. 
3. Incentivizing a “Soft Break-Up” 
A third possible solution to the TBTM problem would impose 
onerous regulations on the largest banks, thereby encouraging 
such firms to break themselves up. This “soft break-up” strategy 
would be functionally similar to a tax on bank size or complex-
ity.186 If calibrated appropriately, graduated capital and liquid-
ity requirements could deter firms from becoming excessively 
large or risky. Broadly speaking, Dodd-Frank adopted a soft 
break-up approach, with the biggest and most complex BHCs 
subject to stricter prudential standards than smaller, simpler 
 
Sector 2002-2011 23–28 (Amsterdam Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. 44, 2013) (finding positive economies of scope in banking that increased 
during the financial crisis). However, some industry-led research finds econo-
mies of scope in the U.S. financial sector. See, e.g., THE CLEARING HOUSE, supra 
note 167, at 17 (concluding that economies of scope provide $15–35 billion in 
value to U.S. banking customers annually). Relatedly, there is evidence that 
U.S. commercial banks’ expansion into other financial activities increased com-
petition and reduced costs for those services. See, e.g., Dongcheol Kim et al., The 
Impact of Commercial Banks on Underwriting Spreads: Evidence from Three 
Decades, 43 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 975, 998 (2008). 
 184. See Kevin J. Stiroh et al., The Dark Side of Diversification: The Case of 
US Financial Holding Companies, 30 J. BANKING & FIN. 2131, 2158–60 (2006) 
(concluding that diversification benefits in financial holding companies are 
more than offset by increased exposure to highly volatile but less profitable non-
interest activities); see also Luc Laeven & Ross Levine, Is There a Diversification 
Discount in Financial Conglomerates?, 85 J. FIN. ECON. 331, 363–65 (2007) (con-
cluding that economies of scope are insufficient to produce a diversification pre-
mium in financial conglomerates); Markus M. Schmid & Ingo Walter, Do Finan-
cial Conglomerates Create or Destroy Economic Value?, 18 J. FIN. 
INTERMEDIATION 193, 214–15 (2009) (finding evidence of diseconomies of scope 
among diversified financial institutions). 
 185. See, e.g., BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER, THE BIG BANK THEORY: BREAK-
ING DOWN THE BREAKUP ARGUMENTS 20 (2014) (“Banks and their customers 
can realize added value when banks provide services complementary to their 
primary offerings. . . . It is more economically efficient for banks to provide 
many of these services in combination.”). 
 186. See BARR ET AL., supra note 34, at 765–66. 
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firms.187 Some critics, however, contend that Dodd-Frank did not 
go far enough, as evidenced by the largest U.S. banks’ continued 
growth.188 Thus, several policymakers have proposed to signifi-
cantly increase prudential standards for the largest firms. For 
example, a bipartisan bill led by Senators Sherrod Brown and 
David Vitter would triple capital requirements for financial in-
stitutions with more than $500 billion in assets.189 Similarly, in 
academia, Professors Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig have ad-
vocated for dramatically increasing capital requirements for the 
largest BHCs.190 
Advocates contend that a soft break-up would mitigate the 
TBTM problem in several ways. First, proponents insist that 
ratcheting up costly prudential regulations on the largest firms 
would incentivize those firms to shrink, making them easier to 
oversee.191 Further, soft break-up advocates assert, substan-
tially increasing capital requirements would alleviate the moral 
hazard problem for any bank that declined to break itself up. 
Higher capital requirements would mean that more equity hold-
ers have skin in the game and, thus, an incentive to monitor the 
bank’s risk profile.192 Moreover, a soft break-up has two im-
portant advantages over alternative break-up strategies. First, 
 
 187. See id. at 756–58 (describing Dodd-Frank’s graduated system of pru-
dential regulation). Noting that some financial companies have divested busi-
ness lines in response to these heightened regulations, Aaron Levine and 
Joshua Macey describe Dodd-Frank as akin to a Pigouvian tax. See Aaron M. 
Levine & Joshua C. Macey, Note, Dodd-Frank Is a Pigouvian Regulation, 127 
YALE L.J. 1336, 1363–401 (2018). 
 188. See, e.g., David Harrison & Ryan Tracy, Fed’s Neel Kashkari: Break Up 
the Big Banks, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 16, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
minneapolis-fed-chief-says-dodd-frank-act-didnt-go-far-enough-1455636718.  
 189. Terminating Bailouts for Taxpayer Fairness Act of 2013, S. 798, 113th 
Cong. (2013). Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis President Neel Kashkari 
has proposed to raise big bank capital requirements to roughly the same level, 
with the express intent of encouraging large firms to shrink. See FED. RESERVE 
BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, THE MINNEAPOLIS PLAN TO END TOO BIG TO FAIL 63–
64 (2017). 
 190. See ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: 
WHAT’S WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 176–83 (2013); see 
also Anat R. Admati et al., Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discus-
sion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity Is Not Socially Expensive 54–57 
(Stanford Univ. Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance, Working Paper No. 161, 2013). 
 191. See ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 190, at 221. 
 192. See id. at 95. Moreover, with a higher capital buffer, if a firm did expe-
rience distress, it would have a bigger cushion to absorb losses. See id. at 220; 
see also Paolo Saguato, The Ownership of Clearinghouses: When “Skin in the 
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because a soft break-up could be calibrated based on a firm’s risk 
profile as well as its size, this approach would be more risk-sen-
sitive than either capping a bank’s size or restricting its activi-
ties.193 Finally, a soft break-up may be more realistic than other 
break-up alternatives because federal regulators already have 
authority to impose heightened prudential standards, and new 
legislation would thus be unnecessary.194 
Despite these potential advantages, however, using a soft 
break-up to solve the TBTM problem could be suboptimal for two 
important reasons. First, it is not obvious that a soft break-up 
would, in fact, shrink the largest banks. Financial institutions 
are notorious for circumventing capital rules and other pruden-
tial regulations through regulatory arbitrage, as occurred with 
securitizations and credit derivatives in the lead-up to the finan-
cial crisis.195 Thus, a soft break-up could perversely lead to banks 
becoming more complex as they shift or re-characterize their ac-
tivities to evade onerous regulations. Moreover, history suggests 
that a soft break-up’s efficacy would wane over time, as banks 
lobby policymakers to water down the content of prudential reg-
ulations.196 Finally, because a soft break-up, by definition, lacks 
hard limits on banks’ size, a firm could continue to grow by fi-
nancing its expansion with equity, as the largest U.S. banks 
have done since Dodd-Frank.197 In sum, a soft break-up strategy 
might not actually address the TBTM problem in practice. 
 
Game” is Not Enough, the Remutualization of Clearinghouses, 34 YALE J. REG. 
601, 635–40 (2017) (discussing skin-in-the-game incentives for financial firms). 
 193. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
 194. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5365(b)(i) (2012). 
 195. See, e.g., Viral V. Acharya et al., Capital, Contingent Capital, and Li-
quidity Requirements, in REGULATING WALL STREET: THE DODD-FRANK ACT 
AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE 143, 147–50 (Viral V. 
Acharya et al. eds., 2011) (explaining how banks used securitization to engage 
in regulatory arbitrage); Erik F. Gerding, Credit Derivatives, Leverage, and Fi-
nancial Regulation’s Missing Macroeconomic Dimension, 8 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 
29, 48, 69–70 (discussing regulatory arbitrage using credit derivatives); Frank 
Partnoy, Financial Derivatives and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J. 
CORP. L. 211, 227–35 (1995) (explaining how derivatives are used for regulatory 
arbitrage).  
 196. See, e.g., Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 53, at 449–91 (describing the grad-
ual decline of Glass-Steagall). 
 197. See supra notes 16–17 (describing growth of large banks); see also SU-
PERVISION AND REGULATION REPORT, supra note 31, at 14 (2018) (depicting in-
crease in large financial institutions’ capital ratios). 
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Second, to the extent that soft break-up measures would 
shrink the largest banks, this approach could suffer from draw-
backs similar to alternative break-up strategies. For example, 
the U.S. financial system could become less efficient if enhanced 
prudential regulations succeed in getting the biggest banks to 
break themselves up.198 Similar to a hard cap on bank size, an 
effectively implemented soft break-up could jeopardize large 
firms’ economies of scale and thereby increase the costs of finan-
cial services for consumers.199 Moreover, as discussed above, reg-
ulatory pressure to downsize or exit complex activities could im-
pair U.S. firms’ international competitiveness, causing financial 
activity to migrate overseas.200 Thus, in addition to its question-
able efficacy, a soft break-up could have problematic side effects. 
All of this is not to say that policymakers should not 
strengthen prudential safeguards. To the contrary, enhanced 
capital and liquidity regulations are eminently sensible tools to 
reduce the likelihood that a bank will experience financial dis-
tress.201 As a response to the TBTM problem, however, a soft 
break-up would involve many of the same undesirable trade-offs 
as other break-up options. 
In sum, even if breaking up the banks were politically feasi-
ble, compelling the largest U.S. financial institutions to shrink 
could create more problems than it solves. In theory, any of the 
three primary break-up options could mitigate the TBTM issue. 
In practice, however, they might also decrease efficiency, hinder 
international competitiveness, or increase risk in the U.S. finan-
cial system. In light of these potential downsides, therefore, uni-
laterally breaking up the banks may be a suboptimal approach 
to the TBTM problem. 
III.  DIVESTITURES: A BETTER WAY TO SOLVE THE 
TBTM PROBLEM   
This Part proposes a better solution to the TBTM problem. 
It recommends that regulators compel a BHC to divest opera-
tions if the firm falls out of compliance with minimum regulatory 
 
 198. See supra notes 162–65 and accompanying text. 
 199. See supra notes 162–65 and accompanying text. 
 200. See supra notes 166–69 and accompanying text. In addition to these 
shortcomings, designing and enforcing an effective soft break-up strategy would 
be more administratively difficult than a straightforward cap on bank size or 
activities restrictions.  
 201. See, e.g., ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 190, at 176–83. 
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standards. Section III.A explains why forced divestitures are su-
perior to other break-up strategies. Section III.B then analyzes 
the numerous existing but unused statutory authorities through 
which regulators could compel divestitures. Finally, Section 
III.C focuses on the most promising of these authorities—section 
4(m) of the BHC Act—through which regulators could force a 
noncompliant FHC to divest its nonbanking operations. Rather 
than waiting for new tools to address the TBTM problem, there-
fore, policymakers should make better use of their existing di-
vestiture authorities. 
A. THE CASE FOR DIVESTITURES 
Under the optimal approach to the TBTM problem, a regu-
latory agency would require a BHC to divest operating segments 
if the company fails to meet minimum regulatory standards. 
Regulators would use this authority sparingly and only after 
other supervisory actions failed to remediate the firm’s underly-
ing issues. Regulators might, for example, order Wells Fargo to 
divest its scandal-plagued wealth management unit or notori-
ously troubled Deutsche Bank to divest its U.S. banking opera-
tions.202 To comply with a divestiture order, the company could 
then sell subsidiaries, spin them off to shareholders, or shutter 
them entirely. Using divestitures in this way would be superior 
to other break-up alternatives for four distinct reasons. 
First, divestitures would safeguard the financial system by 
reducing the size and complexity of the most problematic BHCs. 
Selling, spinning off, or closing subsidiaries could shrink a finan-
cial conglomerate’s balance sheet and simplify its structure, 
thereby making the firm easier to manage.203 Further, by reduc-
ing the company’s systemic footprint, divestitures would limit 
the potential financial stability risks if the firm were to become 
insolvent.204 Importantly, as a remedial measure, divestitures 
 
 202. See Bethany McClean & Ethan Wolff-Mann, Wells Fargo Pushed 
Wealth Advisors to Use High-Fee Products, Cross-Sell, YAHOO FIN. (Aug. 21, 
2018), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/exclusive-wells-fargo-pushed-wealth 
-advisors-use-high-fee-products-cross-sell-131824414.html [https://perma.cc/ 
2PF6-6T78] (describing misconduct in Wells Fargo’s wealth management seg-
ment); Strasburg & Tracy, supra note 25 (discussing Deutsche Bank’s pro-
tracted managerial and financial problems). 
 203. See Flood et al., supra note 81, at 49–50 (concluding that the number 
and geographic dispersion of a conglomerate’s subsidiaries contributes to its op-
erational complexity). 
 204. Cf. LUC LAEVEN ET AL., IMF STAFF DISCUSSION NOTE SDN/14/04, BANK 
SIZE AND SYSTEMIC RISK 14–18 (2014) (discussing stability risks of large banks). 
  
214 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:171 
 
could be targeted to financial institutions that fail to meet mini-
mum supervisory standards. The financial regulatory agencies’ 
continuous, on-site monitoring of the largest financial firms 
would help identify TBTM conglomerates whose financial or 
managerial deficiencies warrant divestitures.205 Thus, divesti-
tures could reduce the systemic footprint of the companies most 
likely to propagate risk through the financial sector. 
Second, in contrast to more draconian break-up proposals, 
targeted divestitures would affect relatively few firms and 
thereby preserve economies of scale and scope for most financial 
conglomerates. One of the primary drawbacks of the most prom-
inent break-up proposals is that they would indiscriminately 
break up large, diversified conglomerates and thereby sacrifice 
the economic efficiencies that such institutions can create, if 
managed appropriately.206 By contrast, Congress has set narrow 
parameters under which regulators may compel divestitures.207 
These strict statutory standards—discussed further in Sections 
III.B and III.C—ensure that relatively few firms would be sub-
ject to divestiture orders. Thus, regulatory divestitures would be 
superior to other approaches to the TBTM problem because they 
would only break up financial conglomerates that fail to meet 
supervisory standards, while allowing the majority of firms to 
continue operating at their existing scale and scope. 
Third, the threat of divestiture would enhance financial in-
stitutions’ incentives to operate prudently. Recent enforcement 
sanctions—ranging from fines to, in Wells Fargo’s case, an asset 
cap—generally lack sufficient punitive weight to change banks’ 
behavior.208 For example, Wells Fargo’s executives estimated 
that the unprecedented asset cap the Federal Reserve imposed 
 
 205. See, e.g., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., SR 12-17, CON-
SOLIDATED SUPERVISION FRAMEWORK FOR LARGE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 9–
10 (2012) (discussing continuous, on-site supervision of large financial institu-
tions). For a discussion of the regulatory agencies’ role as supervisors, see JOHN 
ARMOUR ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 579–86 (2016). For 
thoughtful historical analyses of financial supervision, see Menand, supra note 
19, at 1541–74; Rory Van Loo, Regulatory Monitors, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 
381–84 (2019). 
 206. See supra notes 162–65, 183–85, 188–89 and accompanying text. 
 207. See infra Parts III.B–C. 
 208. See Jeremy Kress, Fed Should Force Wells Fargo into Being a Simpler 
Bank, AM. BANKER (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/ 
fed-should-force-wells-fargo-into-being-a-simpler-bank [https://perma.cc/HS9C 
-ATYZ] (discussing shortcomings of recent enforcement actions). 
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in the aftermath of the fraudulent accounts scandal would im-
pair the firm’s after-tax net income by just $100 million.209 Di-
vesting certain operating segments, by contrast, would meaning-
fully sanction a financial conglomerate for past misconduct or 
excessive risk-taking.210 If regulators were to use their divesti-
ture authority, firms would respond by investing in risk man-
agement and reducing their risk profiles to avoid being the tar-
get of a divestiture order. Some conglomerates might even 
shrink themselves voluntarily to reduce the threat of such a sig-
nificant sanction. In sum, an active divestiture regime would 
have a salutary deterrent effect on TBTM firms. 
Finally, in contrast to other, politically infeasible break-up 
proposals, divestitures do not require new legislative action. To 
the contrary, Congress has already authorized regulators to 
mandate divestitures under several laws dating back as early as 
the 1970s.211 Congressional observers, on the other hand, fore-
cast dim prospects for legislative action on any financial services 
policies—let alone legislation as significant as breaking up the 
banks—in the near future.212 Policymakers’ best hope of address-
ing the TBTM problem, therefore, is by using their existing di-
vestiture authorities. 
In sum, regulatory divestitures are superior to other break-
up plans for several compelling reasons.213 In particular, divest-
itures would reduce the systemic footprint of problematic finan-
cial firms, preserve economies of scale and scope for most insti-
tutions, increase banks’ incentives to operate prudently, and not 
require new legislation. To best address the TBTM problem, 
therefore, regulators should exercise their little-known and un-
derutilized divestiture authorities. 
 
 209. See Ross Kerber, Wells Fargo Trims Expected Hit from Regulatory Cap 
on Assets, REUTERS (May 10, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-wells 
-fargo-investors/wells-fargo-trims-expected-hit-from-regulatory-cap-on-assets 
-idUSKBN1IB1FR [https://perma.cc/8L8V-2GV5]. 
 210. See, e.g., Kress, supra note 208 (estimating that divesting Wells Fargo’s 
nonbank operations would decrease the firm’s revenue by approximately 15%). 
 211. Parts III.B and III.C explore these authorities. 
 212. See Neil Haggerty, Divided Congress = Gridlock for Financial Services 
Policy, AM. BANKER (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/ 
divided-congress-gridlock-for-financial-services-policy  
[https://perma.cc/GX8E-JD3Y]. 
 213. For an argument in favor of divestitures as a sanction in the corporate 
criminal law context, see W. Robert Thomas, Incapacitating Criminal Corpora-
tions, 72 VAND. L. REV. 905, 941–42, 950–54 (2019). 
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B. EXISTING DIVESTITURE AUTHORITIES 
As noted above, the financial regulatory agencies have nu-
merous existing authorities empowering them to order divesti-
tures. The statutory criteria for compelling a divestiture vary. In 
some cases, regulators must demonstrate that the financial in-
stitution has engaged in misconduct; under other authorities, 
regulators have to show that the company poses a threat to fi-
nancial stability. The divestiture authorities, however, all have 
one thing in common: regulators have invoked them exceedingly 
rarely, if at all. This Section explores the numerous ways in 
which regulators could compel a financial institution to divest 
operations, if the agencies chose to do so. 
In perhaps the broadest existing divestiture authority, the 
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act 
of 1989 (FIRREA) authorizes the federal banking agencies to 
compel a divestiture by a bank that engages in an “unsafe or un-
sound practice” or violates a law or regulation.214 Congress has 
never defined “unsafe or unsound practice,”215 but courts have 
interpreted the phrase expansively.216 FIRREA therefore gives 
the agencies wide latitude to bring enforcement actions against 
banks. The agencies exercise this enforcement authority rou-
tinely, yet they invariably seek remedies, such as fines, that are 
far more modest than divestiture.217 Regulators have pursued 
divestitures in response to unsafe or unsound practices or viola-
tions of law only in exceedingly rare circumstances.218 
 
 214. Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 902, 103 Stat. 183, 450 (1989) (codified at 12 
U.S.C. §§ 1818(b)(6)–(7) (2012)) (authorizing the federal banking agencies to re-
quire a firm to “dispose of any loan or asset” or to “place limitations on the 
[firm’s] activities or functions”). 
 215. See Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Fiduciary Duties’ Demanding Cousin: 
Bank Director Liability for Unsafe or Unsound Banking Practices, 63 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 175, 188 (1995). 
 216. See, e.g., in re Seidman, 37 F.3d 911, 928 (3d Cir. 1994) (interpreting 
“unsafe or unsound practice” to refer to any action or inaction that is contrary 
to generally accepted standards of prudent operation and that could pose an 
abnormal risk to the institution’s financial stability). More recently, the Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency has interpreted the phrase even more 
broadly, insisting that regulators need not demonstrate that the practice posed 
a risk to the financial stability of the institution. See Patrick Adams, Enforce-
ment Action No. OCC AA-EC-11-50, 2014 WL 8735096, at *11, *13, (Sept. 30, 
2014). 
 217. See BARR ET AL., supra note 34, at 910–12 (discussing federal banking 
agencies’ enforcement practices). 
 218. See, e.g., Charter Pac. Bank, FDIC Enforcement Action No. 00-034b 
(Feb. 28, 2002) (ordering divestiture of bank’s credit card division). 
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Similarly, pursuant to a 1978 amendment to the BHC Act, 
the Federal Reserve may compel a BHC to divest a subsidiary 
when its continued operation “is inconsistent with sound bank-
ing principles.”219 This authority is designed to protect a holding 
company’s insured depository institution when another subsidi-
ary—for example, its investment bank—poses a risk to the de-
pository institution’s stability.220 The Federal Reserve, however, 
has never attempted to enforce this provision.221 
A third authority permits the federal banking agencies to 
order a divestiture by a bank experiencing severe financial 
stress. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improve-
ment Act of 1991 (FDICIA) established a prompt corrective ac-
tion (PCA) regime that applies increasingly stringent con-
straints on a bank when its regulatory capital ratios fall below 
minimum requirements.222 As a last step before placing a bank 
into receivership, regulators may use their PCA authority to 
compel divestitures of business lines or subsidiaries when the 
bank becomes “significantly undercapitalized,” with a common 
equity tier 1 capital ratio of less than 3% under current law.223 
Most often, however, the regulatory agencies take other reme-
 
 219. Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 105, 92 Stat. 3641, 3646 (codified at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1844(e)(1) (2012)). 
 220. See id. 
 221. Thomas M. Hoenig, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Kan. City, Address 
at The William Taylor Memorial Lecture, It’s Not Over ’Til It’s Over: Leadership 
and Financial Regulation 4 (Oct. 10, 2010) (“[T]he [BHC] Act allow[s] regulators 
to force the termination of activities or sale of subsidiaries that are a risk to the 
safety and soundness of an affiliate bank. To my knowledge, this authority has 
never been successfully used for a major banking organization.”). 
 222. See FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 131, 105 
Stat. 2236, 2258 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (2012)). Dodd-Frank directs the 
Federal Reserve to establish an “early remediation” regime for BHCs that would 
be comparable to the PCA framework for banks. See 12 U.S.C. § 5366(c)(2) 
(2012). The Federal Reserve proposed an early remediation rule in 2012 but has 
never finalized this framework. See Enhanced Prudential Standards and Early 
Remediation Requirements for Covered Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. 596 (proposed 
Jan. 5, 2012). 
 223. 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(f)(2)(I) (permitting regulators to require (1) a signifi-
cantly undercapitalized depository institution to divest subsidiaries, or (2) any 
company that controls the depository institution to divest the institution or 
other subsidiaries); 12 C.F.R. § 324.403(b)(4)(iii) (2019) (establishing regulatory 
capital thresholds for classification of depository institutions as significantly 
undercapitalized). 
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dial actions—such as ordering the bank to raise capital or re-
stricting its interest rates—instead of ordering divestitures 
when a firm becomes significantly undercapitalized.224  
Still other statutory provisions allow federal regulators to 
break up a financial conglomerate if necessary to preserve U.S. 
financial stability. Under Dodd-Frank, for example, the Federal 
Reserve and Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) may 
require a financial institution to divest assets or subsidiaries if 
the firm “poses a grave threat to the financial stability of the 
United States.”225 Similarly, the Federal Reserve and FDIC may 
order a financial institution to divest specified assets or opera-
tions if the company repeatedly fails to submit a credible “living 
will” explaining how the company would be resolved in the event 
of its material financial distress or failure.226 The agencies, how-
ever, have never used either of these authorities. 
In sum, financial regulators have no shortage of tools with 
which to compel divestitures, but they have consistently declined 
to use these authorities. In some respects, the agencies’ hesita-
 
 224. See, e.g., N. Cty. Bank, FDIC Enforcement Action No. 10-431PCAS 
(June 24, 2010) (requiring that a significantly undercapitalized bank either re-
capitalize or be acquired).  
 225. 12 U.S.C. § 5331(a), (a)(5) (2012) (requiring the Board to order divesti-
ture if the Board determines that less aggressive tactics would be “inadequate 
to mitigate a [financial] threat”). For background on FSOC and its role as a 
systemic risk regulator, see generally Hilary J. Allen, Putting the “Financial 
Stability” in Financial Stability Oversight Council, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1087, 1113–
38 (2015) (explaining FSOC’s structure and mandate); Jeremy C. Kress, Patri-
cia A. McCoy & Daniel Schwarcz, Regulating Entities & Activities: Complemen-
tary Approaches to Nonbank Systemic Risk, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2019) (manuscript at 17–24) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=3238059) (charting FSOC’s evolution from an entity-based to 
an activities-based approach to nonbank systemic risk); Daniel Schwarcz & Da-
vid Zaring, Regulation by Threat: Dodd-Frank and the Nonbank Problem, 84 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1813, 1834–38 (2017) (discussing FSOC’s designation power); 
Christina P. Skinner, Regulating Nonbanks: A Plan for SIFI Lite, 105 GEO. L.J. 
1379, 1387–90 (2017) (examining FSOC’s role in filling “institutional gap[s]”). 
 226. 12 U.S.C. § 5365(d)(5)(B) (2012) (“The Board . . . may jointly direct a 
nonbank financial company . . . to divest certain assets . . . [if] the company has 
failed, within the 2-year period . . . to resubmit the resolution plan with such 
revisions as were required.”); Living Wills (or Resolution Plans), BD. OF GOVER-
NORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
supervisionreg/resolution-plans.htm [https://perma.cc/6GUE-SQWN] (“[R]eso-
lution plans . . . commonly known as a living will, must describe the company’s 
strategy for rapid and orderly resolution in the event of material financial dis-
tress or failure of the company.”). 
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tion is understandable. For example, a regulator might be reluc-
tant to order a divestiture under FIRREA because the nebulous 
“unsafe or unsound” standard could be vulnerable to legal chal-
lenge.227 Furthermore, requiring a financially distressed deposi-
tory institution to divest operations under FDICIA could per-
versely hasten its demise if the firm were to sell the assets at a 
loss.228 And given the relative calm in financial markets since 
Dodd-Frank’s enactment, it is reasonable to conclude that no in-
stitution has posed a grave threat sufficient to warrant divesti-
ture under Dodd-Frank’s financial stability provisions. Thus, 
while divestitures are, in theory, a promising response to the 
TBTM problem, these divestiture authorities suffer from poten-
tially problematic limitations that hamper the agencies’ ability 
to use them in practice. 
The foregoing divestiture authorities, however, are not ex-
haustive. A final statutory provision offers regulators the most 
promising strategy to use divestitures to address the TBTM 
problem, but only if the Federal Reserve changes its enforcement 
policies. 
C. SECTION 4(M): THE MOST PROMISING DIVESTITURE 
AUTHORITY 
Under the optimal approach to the TBTM problem, the Fed-
eral Reserve would exercise its statutory authority to compel di-
vestitures by an FHC that falls out of compliance with regulatory 
requirements. Section 4(m) of the BHC Act permits the Federal 
Reserve to order an FHC to divest its nonbank subsidiaries when 
the company or its depository institution subsidiary ceases to be 
“well capitalized” or “well managed,” as defined by regulation.229 
The Federal Reserve, however, has never publicly used this au-
thority, opting instead to put noncompliant FHCs in a “penalty 
box” devoid of meaningful constraints.230 Section III.C.1 explains 
 
 227. See supra note 216 and accompanying text (discussing judicial and ad-
ministrative interpretations of “unsafe or unsound practices”). 
 228. See Anderi Shleifer & Robert Vishnay, Fire Sales in Finance and Mac-
roeconomics, 25 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 29, 29 (quoting KENNETH R. FRENCH 
ET AL., THE SQUAM LAKE REPORT 67 (2010)) (“A bank that simply suffers large 
losses may be forced to reduce its risk by selling assets at distressed or fire-sale 
prices . . . .”). 
 229. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(1), (m)(4) (2012). 
 230. See Brian Christiansen, Sending Financial Holding Cos. To the ‘Penalty 
Box,’ LAW360 (Mar. 14, 2012, 2:20 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/ 
303446 [perma.cc/729V-Q7K4] (describing the “penalty box” for noncompliant 
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why the Federal Reserve’s current approach to noncompliant 
FHCs is unsatisfactory. Section III.C.2 then contends that the 
Federal Reserve’s untapped power to require divestitures by 
noncompliant FHCs represents the most promising strategy for 
addressing the TBTM problem.  
1. The Federal Reserve Has Neglected Section 4(m) 
Section 4(m) of the BHC Act grants the Federal Reserve 
wide latitude to sanction an FHC when it ceases to meet eligibil-
ity standards. This Section explains the Federal Reserve’s cur-
rent, permissive approach when an FHC falls out of compliance 
and why this lenient strategy is misguided. 
a. Understanding the Current Approach 
Recall that FHCs are a special subset of BHCs permitted to 
engage in an expanded range of financial activities. As discussed 
in Section I.A.2, BHCs were historically limited to commercial 
banking and some “closely related” activities like investment ad-
vising and asset management.231 In 1999, however, the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act created a new category of BHCs, called FHCs, 
permitted to engage in an expanded range of financial activities, 
including investment banking, insurance underwriting, and 
merchant banking.232 
Not all holding companies are eligible to become FHCs, how-
ever. To the contrary, FHCs must meet heightened regulatory 
standards to ensure that only strong, well-run firms engage in 
potentially risky financial activities. As amended by Gramm-
Leach-Bliley and Dodd-Frank, section 4 of the BHC Act provides 
that to become and remain an FHC, both the holding company 
itself and all of its insured depository institution subsidiaries 
must be “well capitalized” and “well managed.”233 By regulation, 
the federal banking agencies consider a holding company or de-
pository institution to be “well capitalized” if it maintains capital 
ratios roughly 25% higher than minimum requirements.234 In 
 
FHCs); Kress, supra note 208 (noting that Federal Reserve has never publicly 
used its 4(m) divestiture authority). 
 231. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 232. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 233. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(1) (2012). In addition, for a company to become an 
FHC, all of its subsidiary depository institutions must have at least a satisfac-
tory rating under the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). 12 U.S.C. 
§ 2903(c)(1) (2012).  
 234. Compare 12 C.F.R. § 225.2(r)(1)(i)–(ii) (2019) (providing that a BHC 
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addition, the Federal Reserve deems a holding company or de-
pository institution to be “well managed” if it receives satisfac-
tory management and composite ratings at its annual supervi-
sory examination.235 A BHC that meets these standards may 
elect to become an FHC and thereby engage in the full range of 
financial activities without further Federal Reserve approval.236 
Since Gramm-Leach-Bliley’s enactment, hundreds of holding 
companies, including all of the largest firms, have elected to be-
come FHCs.237 
Section 4(m) of the BHC Act prescribes certain remedial 
measures if a company that elects to become an FHC later falls 
out of compliance with the “well-capitalized” or “well-managed” 
standards. The statute provides that a noncompliant FHC must 
execute an agreement—commonly referred to as a “4(m) agree-
ment”—with the Federal Reserve in which the company commits 
to correcting its deficiencies within 180 days.238 As part of the 
4(m) agreement, the Federal Reserve “may impose such limita-
tions on the conduct or activities of th[e FHC] . . . as [it] deter-
mines to be appropriate under the circumstances. . . .”239 If the 
FHC does not return to compliance within the requisite 180 
days, section 4(m) expressly authorizes the Federal Reserve to 
order the company to divest either its depository institutions or 
its BHC-impermissible activities.240 In practice, such a divesti-
ture order would be akin to revoking the company’s FHC status, 
 
must maintain a 10% total risk-based capital ratio and 6% tier 1 risk-based 
capital ratio to be “well capitalized”), and 12 C.F.R. §§ 6.4(b)(1)(i)–(ii), 
208.43(b)(1)(i)–(ii), 325.103(b)(1) (2019) (providing that an insured depository 
institution must maintain a 10% total risk-based capital ratio and 6% tier 1 
risk-based capital ratio to be “well capitalized”), with 12 C.F.R. §§ 3.10(a)(2)–
(3), 217.10(a)(2)–(3), 324.10(a)(2)–(3) (2019) (requiring a BHC or insured depos-
itory institution to maintain, at a minimum, an 8% total risk-based capital ratio 
and 6% tier 1 risk-based capital ratio). 
 235. 12 C.F.R. § 225.2(s)(1)(i)(A)–(B). 
 236. 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.82(a), (b)(3), (b)(5), 225.85 (2019). Section 4(k)(4) of the 
BHC Act and Federal Reserve regulations enumerate the “financial in nature” 
activities that are permissible for FHCs. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4) (2012); 12 C.F.R. 
§ 225.86 (2019). 
 237. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 238. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(m); Kress, supra note 208 (“[T]he Fed typically 
orders a noncompliant FHC to execute a ‘section 4(m) agreement.’”). 
 239. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(m)(3). 
 240. Id. §§ 1843(m)(4)(A)–(B) (“[T]he Board may require such [FHCs] . . . to 
divest control of any subsidiary depository institution; or at the election of the 
[FHC] instead to cease to engage in any activity . . . that is not an activity that 
is permissible for [BHCs].”). 
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since the company would have to limit itself to activities permis-
sible for a traditional BHC or else exit the regulated banking 
sector entirely. 
The Federal Reserve, however, has never publicly exercised 
its section 4(m) divestiture authority, despite numerous oppor-
tunities to do so.241 Section 4(m) agreements are typically treated 
as confidential supervisory information, as are the examination 
ratings on which a holding company’s well-managed status is 
based.242 Nonetheless, the Federal Reserve has released aggre-
gate data indicating that more than forty percent of large FHCs 
received unsatisfactory composite ratings at their most recent 
supervisory examinations and thus fail to meet the well-man-
aged criteria to maintain their FHC status.243 In fact, in every 
year since 2009, between one-third and one-half of the largest 
holding companies did not satisfy the well-managed require-
ment.244 Recent media leaks have revealed that Wells Fargo and 
Deutsche Bank received supervisory downgrades in 2017 and 
are thus among the noncompliant FHCs.245 If these companies 
failed to correct their managerial deficiencies within the requi-
site 180 days—and it is virtually certain they did not do so—the 
Federal Reserve could order them to divest.246 Yet the Federal 
Reserve has never used this power. 
 
 241. See supra note 230 and accompanying text. 
 242. See Margaret E. Tahyar, Are Bank Regulators Special?, 6 BANKING 
PERS. 22, 27 (2018), https://www.theclearinghouse.org/-/media/new/tch/ 
documents/banking-perspectives/bp-q1-2018-book-v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
K27B-Z7ZC] (“Because the Federal Reserve treats the failure to be well man-
aged as confidential supervisory information, the existence and scope of 4(m) 
limitations are confidential.”). 
 243. SUPERVISION AND REGULATION REPORT, supra note 31, at 15 fig.14. 
 244. See id. By contrast, few FHCs have fallen out of compliance with the 
“well capitalized” standard since the financial crisis. See, e.g., BD. OF GOVER-
NORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., DODD-FRANK ACT STRESS TEST 2018: SUPER-
VISORY STRESS TEST METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 29–30 tbls.4.A–C (2018) 
(demonstrating that all large FHCs are well-capitalized and, based on supervi-
sory models, would remain so during a severe recession). 
 245. See Emily Glazer, Wells Fargo Earns New Ire from Bank Overseers, 
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 5, 2018, 5:56 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wells-fargo 
-earns-new-ire-from-bank-overseers-1515187163 (“In mid-2017, the OCC down-
graded one element in Wells Fargo’s CAMELS rating. . . . Management[ ]  was 
downgraded to a 3 from a 2 . . . signif[ying] that oversight ‘needs improve-
ment.’”); Strasburg & Tracy, supra note 25 (“The Federal Reserve has desig-
nated Deutsch Bank . . . as being in a ‘troubled condition.’”). 
 246. See Kress, supra note 208 (expressing doubt that regulators have up-
graded Wells Fargo’s supervisory rating). 
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Rather than exercise its section 4(m) divestiture authority, 
the Federal Reserve typically takes a much more permissive ap-
proach: it routinely extends a noncompliant FHC’s section 4(m) 
agreement.247 The Federal Reserve, in other words, gives the 
company additional time in which to remediate the deficiencies 
that it failed to address within the initial 180-day period. Bank-
ing industry lawyers often refer to the time a noncompliant FHC 
spends subject to a section 4(m) agreement as the “penalty 
box.”248 The practical effect of being in the penalty box, however, 
is virtually meaningless.  
During the pendency of a section 4(m) agreement, the Fed-
eral Reserve generally permits a firm to continue engaging in all 
of its existing activities, including investment banking, insur-
ance underwriting, and merchant banking.249 The only substan-
tive constraints in most section 4(m) agreements are prohibi-
tions on commencing a new financial activity or acquiring shares 
of a company engaged in a BHC-impermissible activity.250 These 
restrictions, however, have little practical effect on the largest 
FHCs, which already engage in the full panoply of financial ac-
tivities and may therefore continue these activities even when 
they are not “well capitalized” or “well managed.” Thus, despite 
statutory authority to limit a noncompliant FHC’s activities or 
even mandate divestitures, the Federal Reserve routinely per-
mits such a firm to continue conducting business as usual. 
The Federal Reserve’s reasons for neglecting its section 4(m) 
authority are not clear, as the agency has never publicly ex-
plained why it permits chronically noncompliant FHCs to con-
tinue engaging in expanded financial activities.251 To be sure, 
the Federal Reserve’s reluctance to invoke section 4(m) could be 
attributable to regulatory capture.252 Similarly, the agency’s in-
action might reflect limitations in its ability to supervise big 
 
 247. See T.J. Grasmick, Dodd-Frank and Reconsidering Financial Holding 
Company Status, LEXOLOGY (Sept. 13, 2010), https://www.lexology.com/library/ 
detail.aspx?g=f663b8fa-8f11-4b9c-94f5-df2f059e75d8 [https://perma.cc/82BN 
-CKPY] (“[I]n practice, cure agreements usually require extensions and become 
little more than an additional supervisory burden.”). 
 248. See Christiansen, supra note 230. 
 249. See Christiansen, supra note 230 (“During the conformance period, the 
FHC generally is permitted to retain existing activities.”); supra note 53 and 
accompanying text.  
 250. See Christiansen, supra note 230. 
 251. See, e.g., supra note 230 and accompanying text. 
 252. See, e.g., Kevin Wack, Fed Faulted for Failing to Do More to Prevent 
Regulatory Capture, AM. BANKER (Dec. 7, 2017, 1:31 PM), https://www 
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banks and accurately assess their managerial capabilities.253 
While these rationales may be partially true, they likely do not 
fully explain the Federal Reserve’s reluctance to use section 
4(m). Indeed, the agency has adopted meaningful post-crisis reg-
ulatory reforms despite regulatory capture concerns.254 Moreo-
ver, there are reasonable steps the Federal Reserve could take 
to enhance its supervisory processes if it wanted to use section 
4(m), as discussed below in Section V.D. 
The most plausible explanation for the Federal Reserve’s 
passive approach to section 4(m) is that its inaction has become 
a self-fulfilling prophecy. The Federal Reserve is well known for 
being a conservative institution built on tradition and “secret 
lore.”255 In the immediate aftermath of Gramm-Leach-Bliley, the 
notoriously pro-industry Alan Greenspan-era Federal Reserve 
opted not to use the agency’s new section 4(m) divestiture au-
thority.256 This industry-friendly precedent made it less likely 
that the Federal Reserve would invoke section 4(m) in the future. 
Indeed, if the Federal Reserve were to order a noncompliant 
FHC to divest its financial activities today, the agency would no 
doubt face criticism that it was acting arbitrarily and capri-
ciously, given its decades-long neglect of section 4(m).257 Accord-
ingly, the Federal Reserve does not use its section 4(m) authority 
today, at least in part, because it has never used it in the past. 
Whatever the reason, the Federal Reserve has consistently 
taken an extremely permissive approach to chronically noncom-
pliant FHCs. Rather than using its divestiture authority, the 




 253. See Menand, supra note 19, at 1583–86 (discussing practical con-
straints on the Federal Reserve’s supervisory discretion). 
 254. For an overview of post-crisis regulatory reforms adopted by the Fed-
eral Reserve and other financial regulators, see Jacob J. Lew, Eight Years After 
the Financial Crisis: How Wall Street Reform Strengthened Our Financial Sys-
tem and Laid the Foundation for Long-Run Growth, 19 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. 
POL’Y 611, 614–19, 621–24 (2016). 
 255. Tahyar, supra note 242, at 24. 
 256. For background and discussion of Alan Greenspan’s deregulatory ideol-
ogy, see SEBASTIAN MALLABY, THE MAN WHO KNEW: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF 
ALAN GREENSPAN 58–75 (2016). 
 257. As this Article suggests, however, the Federal Reserve could avoid alle-
gations of arbitrariness by promulgating a rule establishing in advance how it 
plans to implement section 4(m). See infra Part IV. 
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by statute: it keeps such companies in an extended, but function-
ally meaningless, penalty box. 
b. Drawbacks of the Current Approach 
The Federal Reserve’s lenient approach to noncompliant 
FHCs is flawed for three important reasons. First, the ineffec-
tual section 4(m) penalty box fails to hold noncompliant FHCs 
accountable for their weak supervisory condition, thereby expos-
ing the financial system to risks. Second, the Federal Reserve’s 
practice of continually extending section 4(m) agreements with-
out imposing meaningful constraints is contrary to Congres-
sional intent. Finally, the lack of transparency and clear guide-
lines in the Federal Reserve’s current approach raises questions 
about democratic accountability and the rule of law. 
The primary drawback of the Federal Reserve’s light-touch 
approach is that it does not adequately penalize an FHC for fail-
ing to comply with the “well-capitalized” or “well-managed” re-
quirements. These eligibility standards are supposed to ensure 
that only strong, well-run firms are able to engage in risky fi-
nancial activities that, if mismanaged, could threaten the stabil-
ity of the financial system.258 The absence of meaningful con-
straints in a section 4(m) agreement, however, gives a company 
little additional incentive to remediate its deficiencies when it 
falls out of compliance with the “well-capitalized” or “well-man-
aged” criteria. The lack of urgency, in turn, exposes the financial 
sector to serious risks. Indeed, many of the United States’ largest 
financial conglomerates still engage in potentially volatile non-
banking activities despite not satisfying the requisite prudential 
standards.259 
 
 258. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ 
Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 261 (2010) (“[A]s a factual matter, non-bank activities of 
bank holding companies are riskier than their banking activities.”); see also Pru-
dential Standards for Large Bank Holding Companies and Savings and Loan 
Holding Companies, 83 Fed. Reg. 61408, 61415 (proposed Nov. 29, 2018) (to be 
codified in scattered sections of 12 C.F.R.) (“Nonbank activities may involve a 
broader range of risks than those associated with purely banking activi-
ties . . . . If not adequately managed, the risks associated with nonbanking ac-
tivities could present significant safety and soundness concerns and increase 
financial stability risks.”). As Professor Saule Omarova contends, risks associ-
ated with one particular FHC-permissible activity—physical commodities trad-
ing—may be especially pronounced. See Saule T. Omarova, The Merchants of 
Wall Street: Banking, Commerce, and Commodities, 98 MINN. L. REV. 265, 343–
46 (2013). 
 259. See supra notes 243–45 and accompanying text. 
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Relatedly, this permissive approach to noncompliant FHCs 
runs counter to Congressional intent. Under its current stance, 
the Federal Reserve essentially treats the “well-capitalized” and 
“well-managed” standards as qualification thresholds that com-
panies must satisfy at a single point in time, when they first elect 
to become FHCs.260 After a company has elected FHC status, 
however, the Federal Reserve allows it to fall out of compliance 
while continuing to engage in the full range of financial activi-
ties.261 This perverse outcome is not what Congress intended 
when it created the FHC designation. Rather, the BHC Act 
makes clear that the “well-capitalized” and “well-managed” eli-
gibility standards are to be applied on an ongoing basis, with 
meaningful consequences for FHCs that fall out of compliance.262 
Moreover, the Federal Reserve’s refusal to enforce section 4(m) 
is particularly troubling in light of the Dodd-Frank Act’s expan-
sion of the “well-capitalized” and “well-managed” standards to 
cover not only an FHC’s subsidiary banks—as Gramm-Leach-
Bliley originally provided—but also the holding company it-
self.263 By strengthening the FHC qualification thresholds, Con-
gress effectively endorsed section 4(m) as a response to the 
TBTM problem. 
Finally, the Federal Reserve’s current approach to section 
4(m) raises serious questions about transparency, democratic ac-
countability, and the rule of law. Under the existing system, the 
Federal Reserve and other federal banking agencies might lack 
appropriate incentives to upgrade a firm’s supervisory rating 
 
 260. See supra Part III.C.1.a. 
 261. See supra notes 249–50 and accompanying text. 
 262. Notably, the BHC Act establishes a mild sanction when an FHC’s sub-
sidiary depository institution receives a less than satisfactory CRA rating. See 
supra note 233 (describing CRA eligibility requirement). Specifically, the Act 
provides that the FHC may not commence a new BHC-impermissible activity 
or acquire control of a company engaged in a BHC-impermissible activity if its 
depository institution subsidiary falls out of compliance with the CRA require-
ment. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(2) (2012). The BHC Act’s possible divestiture sanction 
for noncompliance with the well-capitalized and well-managed requirements is, 
by comparison, relatively severe. In practice, however, the Federal Reserve ap-
plies a penalty for falling out of compliance with the prudential requirements 
that is equivalent to the mild penalty for CRA noncompliance. The Federal Re-
serve should not treat both types of noncompliance equally, however, because 
an FHC’s failure to remain well capitalized or well managed suggests that the 
firm poses potential safety-and-soundness and financial stability concerns, 
while its failure to maintain a satisfactory CRA rating does not. See supra notes 
233, 258 and accompanying text. 
 263. See supra note 55. 
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when it eventually corrects its deficiencies.264 On this view, an 
agency might assign and maintain unsatisfactory supervisory 
ratings, at least in part, to avoid embarrassment were another 
financial crisis to happen at a time when financial institutions 
are all highly rated, as occurred in 2008.265 Persistent unsatis-
factory supervisory ratings can have adverse consequences for a 
firm—ranging from branching restrictions to limits on mergers 
and acquisitions.266 Nonetheless, the supervisory agencies might 
allow these unsatisfactory ratings to persist, while the Federal 
Reserve continues extending the applicable section 4(m) agree-
ment without making difficult, public decisions about when and 
under what circumstances more severe sanctions should ap-
ply.267 In this way, the agencies can leave firms in supervisory 
limbo in an effort to shield themselves from public criticism if a 
highly-rated firm were to collapse. Accordingly, the Federal Re-
serve’s poorly defined approach to confidential section 4(m) 
agreements calls into question the legitimacy of the “secret 
realm” of bank supervision.268 
In sum, the Federal Reserve’s current treatment of noncom-
pliant FHCs fails to sufficiently penalize those firms, runs coun-
ter to Congressional intent, and raises questions about supervi-
sory agencies’ transparency and legitimacy. Even more 
troublingly, by failing to meaningfully sanction FHCs when they 
fall out of compliance with prudential standards, the Federal Re-
serve has neglected a potentially powerful tool for addressing the 
TBTM problem. 
 
 264. By law, an individual firm’s supervisory ratings are confidential. See 
Tahyar, supra note 242, at 24. The Federal Reserve, however, recently began 
releasing aggregate data on holding company ratings. See SUPERVISION AND 
REGULATION REPORT, supra note 31, at 15 fig.14. 
 265. See SUPERVISION AND REGULATION REPORT, supra note 31, at 15 fig.14 
(showing that nearly all large holding companies received satisfactory supervi-
sory ratings in 2007 and 2008). 
 266. See 12 U.S.C. § 36(g)(2)(A) (2012) (prohibiting a national bank from in-
terstate de novo branching unless the bank is well managed); 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1831u(b)(4)(B) (2012) (prohibiting an interstate bank merger unless the re-
sulting bank would be well managed upon consummation of the transaction). 
 267. Moreover, as Margaret Tahyar asserts, this “secret realm” of confiden-
tial supervisory oversight gives agencies extraordinary discretion to grant waiv-
ers, make exceptions, or otherwise vary the terms supervisory restrictions, 
without appropriate checks and balances. See Tahyar, supra note 242, at 26–
28.  
 268. Id. at 26. 
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2. The Promise of Section 4(m) Divestitures 
A more coherent approach to section 4(m) would be policy-
makers’ best strategy for addressing the TBTM problem. Requir-
ing divestitures under section 4(m) in appropriate circumstances 
would not only restore meaning to the “well-capitalized” and 
“well-managed” standards, it would also protect the financial 
system from FHCs that are too big or complex to satisfy those 
prudential safeguards. By establishing a framework for compel-
ling divestitures by noncompliant FHCs, the Federal Reserve 
could achieve benefits similar to other divestiture authorities, 
but with the additional advantages of appropriate thresholds 
and predictability. 
Like other divestiture authorities, using section 4(m) to com-
pel divestitures by individual firms would have several ad-
vantages over broader break-up proposals. For example, section 
4(m) would affect only the riskiest FHCs, as measured by their 
capital ratios and supervisory exams, thereby preserving econo-
mies of scale and scope for most financial firms.269 In this way, 
section 4(m) appropriately recognizes that not all large financial 
conglomerates are TBTM. However, if a firm demonstrates that 
it is TBTM and fails to improve its weaknesses, section 4(m) pro-
vides a mechanism to shrink the firm’s systemic footprint and 
make it easier to manage.  
Moreover, similar to other divestiture authorities, section 
4(m) would enhance FHCs’ incentives to comply with regulatory 
requirements.270 Whereas the Federal Reserve’s current, lenient 
approach to section 4(m) is unlikely to deter FHCs from miscon-
duct or excessive risk-taking, compulsory divestitures for non-
compliant FHCs would increase firms’ incentives to operate pru-
dently and invest in risk management and compliance systems. 
And, like other existing divestiture authorities, section 4(m) is 
superior to legislative break-up proposals because it does not re-
quire new congressional action. 
While section 4(m) shares many of the same advantages as 
other divestiture authorities, it has two important features that 
distinguish it from regulators’ other divestiture powers. First, 
section 4(m)’s “well-capitalized” and “well-managed” standards 
are appropriate thresholds at which regulators should mandate 
that a financial conglomerate break itself up. Many other divest-
iture authorities, by contrast, set too stringent a threshold for 
 
 269. See, e.g., supra notes 203–08. 
 270. See supra notes 208–13. 
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when regulators may force a financial institution to divest. For 
example, waiting until a financial institution poses a “grave 
threat” to U.S. financial stability before ordering a divestiture 
could be too late to mitigate risks to financial stability.271 Like-
wise, compelling a divestiture only when a depository institution 
becomes “significantly undercapitalized” could be insufficient to 
save the firm from failure.272 By comparison, section 4(m) strikes 
the appropriate balance by revoking an FHC’s status when it 
fails to meet heightened capital and management standards but 
before it poses an imminent threat to the financial system. 
Section 4(m)’s “well-capitalized” and “well-managed” crite-
ria are not only better calibrated than other divestiture stand-
ards, they are also more predictable and, accordingly, more 
likely to survive judicial review. Many existing divestiture au-
thorities are highly discretionary, and regulators have estab-
lished little guidance for how they might be interpreted. 
FIRREA’s broad “unsafe or unsound practice” standard, for ex-
ample, has been characterized as “ambiguous” and “vague.”273 
Critically, the standard has been subject to protracted and re-
curring judicial battles, as agencies and litigants wrangle over 
what constitutes an unsafe or unsound practice.274 The BHC 
Act’s “inconsistent with sound banking principles” standard like-
wise lacks a broadly accepted definition.275 Regulators, there-
fore, might be appropriately cautious to stake a penalty as sig-
nificant as divestiture on such an ambiguous—and legally 
vulnerable—statutory standard.  
Section 4(m)’s divestiture criteria, by contrast, are reasona-
bly well defined. Indeed, the “well-capitalized” standard is 
strictly numeric—10% total and 6% tier 1 risk-based capital—
leaving little room for regulatory discretion.276 Even the “well-
 
 271. 12 U.S.C. § 5331(a) (2012). 
 272. 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(f), (f)(2)(I) (2012). 
 273. Thomas L. Holzman, Unsafe or Unsound Practices: Is the Current Ju-
dicial Interpretation of the Term Unsafe or Unsound?, 19 ANN. REV. BANKING 
L. 425, 425, 435 (2000). 
 274. See id. at 436–41, 444–52 (cataloguing the evolution of judicial circuit 
splits over the term “unsafe or unsound”); see also Patrick Adams, Enforcement 
Action No. OCC AA-EC-11-50, 2014 WL 8735096, at *11, *13, (Sept. 30, 2014) 
(discussing OCC’s evolving interpretation of “unsafe or unsound practice”). 
 275. Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 105, 92 Stat. 3641, 3646 (codified at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1844(e)(1)(2012)); see Hoenig, supra note 221 (noting that the Federal Reserve 
has never used the BHC Act authority to compel a divestiture). 
 276. See supra note 234 (describing risk-based capital requirements). 
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managed” standard, which necessarily relies on supervisors’ dis-
cretionary exam ratings, is clearer than the other divestiture au-
thorities.277 Indeed, the regulatory agencies publish detailed su-
pervisory manuals establishing guidelines for assessing exam 
ratings.278 Most prominently, the Federal Reserve recently 
promulgated, through notice-and-comment rulemaking, revised 
standards for assessing supervisory ratings, including thorough 
explanations of its evaluation criteria.279 Section 4(m)’s stand-
ards, therefore, are significantly clearer than the more discre-
tionary standards in other divestiture authorities. Divestiture 
standards under section 4(m) would be easier for regulators to 
apply, clearer for financial institutions to understand, and more 
likely to survive judicial review. 
Thus, using section 4(m) to compel divestitures by noncom-
pliant FHCs would be the optimal solution to the TBTM prob-
lem. By exercising its section 4(m) powers, the Federal Reserve 
could shrink the most problematic firms without the drawbacks 
of more draconian break-up plans. Moreover, in contrast to other 
divestiture authorities, section 4(m) establishes an appropriate 
threshold for when financial conglomerates should be required 
to divest, and it is less susceptible to judicial challenge. Accord-
ingly, the Federal Reserve should use its section 4(m) divestiture 
authority in appropriate circumstances as a strategy to combat 
the TBTM problem. 
IV.  A DIVESTITURE FRAMEWORK   
For the foregoing reasons, the Federal Reserve should adopt 
a policy specifying when it will require a noncompliant FHC to 
divest operations. This Part sketches out a framework in which 
the Federal Reserve would provide a noncompliant FHC two 
years to correct its deficiencies and, if the FHC fails to remediate 
 
 277. Compare supra note 235 and accompanying text (discussing section 
4(m)’s “well-managed” standard), with supra notes 214–17, 273–74 and accom-
panying text (examining FIREA’s “unsafe or unsound” standard), and supra 
notes 219–21 and accompanying text (describing the BHC Act’s “inconsistent 
with sound banking principles” standard). 
 278. See, e.g., FDIC, RISK MANAGEMENT MANUAL OF EXAMINATION POLI-
CIES §§ 2.1–7.1 (2017) (providing detailed information about CAMELS rating 
system); see also Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System, 61 Fed. Reg. 
67021, 67025–29 (Dec. 19, 1996) (establishing guidelines for CAMELS supervi-
sory rating system). 
 279. See Large Financial Institution Rating System; Regulations K and LL, 
83 Fed. Reg. 58724, 58734–39 (Nov. 21, 2018) (describing the CAMELS rating 
system). 
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its issues during that time, an additional two years to divest its 
depository institution subsidiaries or BHC-impermissible activ-
ities. When put into practice, this new framework will mitigate 
the TBTM problem by imposing a fair, but meaningful divesti-
ture sanction on FHCs that fail to satisfy statutorily mandated 
prudential standards. 
To implement an effective divestiture policy, the Federal Re-
serve should adopt a regulation pre-committing that it will use 
its section 4(m) divestiture authority when an FHC has been out 
of compliance with the well-capitalized or well-managed stand-
ard for two years. Recall that the BHC Act requires a noncom-
pliant FHC to correct its deficiencies within 180 days, after 
which the Federal Reserve may compel divestitures.280 This 180-
day grace period is almost certainly too short for a noncompliant 
FHC to remediate its financial or managerial issues. Indeed, 
firms typically need at least a full annual examination cycle to 
demonstrate improvement sufficient to merit an upgrade of an 
unsatisfactory supervisory rating.281 The Federal Reserve 
should thus use its discretion to lengthen the statutory 
timeframe to two years. Accordingly, the new policy would pro-
vide a noncompliant FHCs two examination cycles in which to 
raise sufficient capital or improve its managerial deficiencies. 
Two years provides an FHC ample time to fix its problems, but 
not so long as to allow its deficiencies to pose a threat to the 
broader financial system. 
The policy would pre-commit that, if an FHC does not return 
to compliance within two years, the Federal Reserve will order 
the FHC to divest its depository institution subsidiaries or its 
BHC-impermissible activities within the following two years. 
Thus, after two years of noncompliance, the FHC would have an 
additional two years in which to sell, spin off, or close its banking 
or BHC-impermissible nonbanking operations. This two-year 
deadline would give a firm sufficient time to plan and execute a 
divestiture. The Federal Reserve’s order would be final. Even if 
the FHC were to correct its deficiencies during the second two-
year period, it would still be required to divest. The policy would, 
however, provide for a possible extension of the divestiture dead-
line if the Financial Stability Oversight Council determined that 
 
 280. See supra notes 238, 240 and accompanying text. 
 281. See Grasmick, supra note 247 (“[S]ince it generally takes at least 1 or 2 
examination cycles before a bank enforcement can be terminated and 3 and 4 
CAMELS ratings can be upgraded, cure agreements often cannot be satisfied as 
quickly as Regulation Y contemplates.”). 
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a longer divestiture deadline would be necessary to preserve fi-
nancial stability.282 
Importantly, the Federal Reserve should adopt this section 
4(m) framework through notice-and-comment rulemaking. Sub-
jecting the policy to public notice-and-comment would accom-
plish several important objectives. First, it would provide the fi-
nancial sector and the public an opportunity to provide feedback 
on the policy, perhaps strengthening the framework and increas-
ing its legitimacy. Moreover, in contrast to informal guidance, a 
formal regulation would reduce the Federal Reserve’s supervi-
sory discretion that has plagued section 4(m) enforcement in the 
past.283 In addition, given the gravity of the divestiture sanction, 
it would be appropriate for the Federal Reserve to notify the fi-
nancial sector before adopting such a significant change in its 
enforcement practices. Finally, by promulgating its framework 
through rulemaking, the Federal Reserve would avoid allega-
tions of arbitrariness if it were to order a section 4(m) divestiture 
with no notice after twenty years of failing to enforce the provi-
sion.284 
In sum, this proposed framework would rationalize and clar-
ify the Federal Reserve’s heretofore obscure, ad hoc approach to 
section 4(m) enforcement. The policy sketched out in this Part 
would give a noncompliant FHC a two-year deadline to remedi-
ate its problems, after which it would have to divest operations 
within the following two years, subject to extension by the FSOC. 
This framework would finally give meaning to the BHC Act’s 
heightened prudential standards for FHCs that engage in ex-
panded financial activities. The policy, in turn, would mitigate 
the TBTM problem by shrinking firms whose supervisory rec-
ords indicate that they are too large or complex to oversee effec-
tively. 
V.  RESPONDING TO OBJECTIONS 
Critics might raise several objections to this proposed di-
vestiture framework. For example, opponents might contend 
that a section 4(m) divestiture would destabilize an FHC or the 
broader financial system, punish the FHC inappropriately, or 
constitute a regulatory taking. Further, critics might question 
 
 282. For further discussion of the financial stability implications of divesti-
tures, see infra Part V.A. 
 283. Cf. supra note 277 and accompanying text. 
 284. See supra text accompanying note 257. 
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whether the Federal Reserve will, in practice, follow through 
with ordering a noncompliant FHC to divest. As this Part ex-
plains, however, none of these potential objections withstands 
scrutiny. 
A. WOULD DIVESTITURES BE DESTABILIZING? 
Some critics might oppose a robust section 4(m) divestiture 
regime on the ground that such divestitures could destabilize in-
dividual institutions and, by extension, the broader financial 
system. According to this critique, to the extent that a noncom-
pliant FHC is already in some degree of financial or managerial 
distress, compelling the firm to divest significant segments 
might further weaken its condition. Moreover, if many firms 
were required to divest simultaneously—recall that at least forty 
percent of large institutions are currently not well managed285—
the ensuing transactions could disrupt the wider financial sec-
tor. 
These objections, however, are unpersuasive for two rea-
sons. First, if structured appropriately, a divestiture need not 
destabilize a troubled financial institution. To the contrary, a di-
vestiture could have a salutary effect on a firm to the extent that 
it spins off or shuts down weak or non-core operations. For ex-
ample, insurance conglomerates MetLife and AIG recently di-
vested sizable segments in response to regulatory pressures, yet 
neither firm suffered significant operational or financial disrup-
tion.286 Moreover, the two-year period in which to complete a 
mandatory divestiture under the proposed framework would 
provide an institution ample time to plan and execute an orderly 
divestiture, thereby minimizing potential adverse effects. 
Second, widespread divestitures are unlikely. Although 
many FHCs do not satisfy the well-managed requirement, these 
firms have relatively little incentive to improve their supervisory 
condition under the current section 4(m) enforcement regime.287 
 
 285. See supra note 243 and accompanying text. 
 286. See Aaron Back, Gloom Could Lift for MetLife After Brighthouse Split, 
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 6, 2016, 3:25 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/gloom-could 
-lift-for-metlife-after-brighthouse-split-1475781921; Agnel Philip & Sonali 
Basak, AIG Asset Sales Near $100 Billion With Mortgage Unit Exit: Table, 
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 19, 2016, 7:01 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2016-08-19/aig-asset-sales-near-100-billion-with-mortgage-unit-exit-
table. 
 287. See supra notes 248–54 and accompanying text (discussing the Federal 
Reserve’s lenient approach to noncompliant FHCs). 
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However, firms would invest in improving their risk manage-
ment and corporate governance if the Federal Reserve were to 
credibly commit that noncompliant FHCs must divest opera-
tions. Thus, the prospect of pervasive divestitures would be re-
mote. Rather, after the Federal Reserve first orders a noncom-
pliant FHC to divest, the remaining noncompliant firms would 
take the necessary steps to return to compliance. Moreover, even 
if supervisory conditions were to warrant numerous, simultane-
ous divestitures, the FSOC could grant extensions as necessary 
to ensure the transactions do not threaten financial stability. In 
sum, therefore, the proposed section 4(m) divestiture framework 
is unlikely to have a destabilizing effect. 
B. DOES THE PUNISHMENT FIT THE CRIME? 
Next, critics might contend that, at least in some situations, 
the section 4(m) divestiture sanction would be inappropriate 
given the nature of a firm’s supervisory problems. According to 
this objection, if a noncompliant FHC’s managerial issues are 
confined to its bank subsidiary—as appears to be the case with 
Wells Fargo, for example288—it would be unfair to force the com-
pany to divest its investment bank and other nonbank opera-
tions.289 In such circumstances, opponents might object that the 
divestiture punishment is inconsistent with the firm’s underly-
ing problems. 
This objection is easily rebutted. Congress envisioned this 
exact situation, and it specifically authorized the Federal Re-
serve to revoke a firm’s FHC status due to protracted supervi-
sory issues in its bank subsidiary. In fact, when Congress first 
created the FHC designation, the condition of a company’s bank 
subsidiary was the only prudential requirement for becoming 
 
 288. See Ethan Wolff-Mann, Every Wells Fargo Consumer Scandal Since 
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and remaining an FHC, and the condition of the firm’s nonbank-
ing operations was irrelevant.290 It was not until two decades 
later, in Dodd-Frank, that Congress added the additional re-
quirement that the holding company itself—including its non-
bank operations—satisfy the well-capitalized and well-managed 
requirements.291 Accordingly, Congress has expressly indicated 
that revoking a company’s FHC status is an appropriate punish-
ment when the firm’s bank subsidiary experiences protracted su-
pervisory issues, regardless of the condition of the firm’s non-
bank operations. 
Moreover, it is perfectly sensible that prolonged bank-level 
supervisory problems should disqualify an FHC from engaging 
in expanded financial activities. Financial or managerial defi-
ciencies at a conglomerate’s bank subsidiary could be an early 
warning signal for emerging issues in the firm’s nonbanking op-
erations. Indeed, if the firm cannot appropriately manage risks 
in its bank, it is reasonable to doubt its ability to oversee poten-
tially riskier and more volatile nonbanking activities.292 In this 
way, divesting BHC-impermissible activities would be both pu-
nitive and prudential. A mandatory divestiture would penalize a 
noncompliant FHC for failing to meet supervisory expectations, 
and it would reduce the systemic footprint of a firm with demon-
strated weaknesses in critical areas. Accordingly, claims that the 
Federal Reserve should refrain from ordering section 4(m) di-
vestitures because the punishment does not fit the crime are un-
convincing. 
C. ARE DIVESTITURES REGULATORY TAKINGS? 
Critics might further object that a section 4(m) divestiture 
order would constitute an impermissible regulatory taking. On 
this view, a divestiture mandate would violate the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which requires just compensa-
tion when the government appropriates private property for pub-
lic use.293 A noncompliant FHC might challenge a divestiture or-
der in court on this basis. 
 
 290. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 103, 113 Stat. 
1338, 1346–47 (1999). 
 291. See Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 606, 124 Stat. 1376, 1607 (2010). 
 292. See Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 258, at 260–61 (characterizing 
nonbank activities as risky). 
 293. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
  
236 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:171 
 
Such a challenge, however, would be highly unlikely to suc-
ceed. The Federal Reserve’s authority to compel divestitures un-
der section 4(m) is supported by decades of regulatory takings 
jurisprudence. When evaluating whether a regulatory action 
constitutes a taking, a court typically considers, among other fac-
tors, the extent to which the action interferes with the claimant’s 
“distinct investment-backed expectations.”294 The highly regu-
lated nature of the banking sector precludes a firm from showing 
that a divestiture order interfered with its investment-backed 
expectations. Indeed, courts have consistently held that a com-
pany’s participation in a highly regulated industry like finance 
weighs strongly against the firm’s regulatory takings claim.295 
When a BHC elects to become an FHC, it does so with the 
knowledge that failing to remain well capitalized and well man-
aged could result in a section 4(m) divestiture order.296 Accord-
ingly, a regulatory taking challenge to such a divestiture would 
almost certainly fail.  
D. DO SUPERVISORY RATINGS HAVE PREDICTIVE VALUE? 
Critics might also contend that supervisory ratings are lag-
ging indicators of a bank’s condition and, therefore, lack predic-
tive power. Because a bank’s rating is treated as confidential su-
pervisory information, this claim is difficult to assess on a firm-
by-firm basis.297 Nonetheless, critics may cite aggregate data 
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suggesting that supervisory ratings generally were not predic-
tive of the 2008 crisis, with fewer than ten percent of banks and 
large BHCs rated in less-than-satisfactory condition in 2006 and 
2007.298 If, as this data indicate, supervisory ratings do not cor-
relate with a firm’s future performance, then breaking up firms 
with weak supervisory ratings may be inappropriate or ineffec-
tive. 
There is ample evidence, however, that ratings downgrades 
and other supervisory warnings can be leading indicators of a 
bank’s distress or misconduct in certain circumstances. To be 
sure, supervisory ratings may not be predictive of market-wide 
crises, such as the one that occurred in 2008. In such cases, su-
pervisors likely suffer from similar cognitive biases as the banks 
themselves—for instance, the shared assumption that housing 
prices would not simultaneously decline nationwide.299 The pub-
licly-available evidence, however, suggests that supervisors are 
reasonably competent at identifying an individual firm’s idiosyn-
cratic managerial problems that could lead to material financial 
loss or consumer harm. The Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency (OCC), for example, flagged Wells Fargo’s aggressive sales 
practices as a problem in 2010—before the worst of the fake ac-
counts scandal—and factored these supervisory concerns into 
Wells Fargo’s operational risk rating.300 Likewise, the Federal 
Reserve downgraded Deutsche Bank’s U.S. operations to trou-
bled condition in 2017, before the firm’s solvency was called into 
serious doubt.301 More examples of the predictive value of super-
visory ratings would undoubtedly be available but for the secrecy 
generally afforded to confidential supervisory information. 
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Moreover, the argument against breaking up noncompliant 
FHCs based on the weak predictive value of supervisory ratings 
suffers from an obvious logical flaw. The critics’ argument hinges 
on evidence that the agencies overestimated institutions’ condi-
tion in the lead-up to the 2008 crisis, at which point many firms 
failed despite satisfactory ratings.302 But just because satisfac-
tory supervisory ratings do not always predict strong future per-
formance, it does not necessarily follow that less-than-satisfac-
tory supervisory ratings are equally skewed. To the contrary, one 
would expect less-than-satisfactory ratings to be more accu-
rate—and therefore more predictive—than satisfactory ratings. 
That is because supervisors could inadvertently overlook finan-
cial or managerial weaknesses and inaccurately assign satisfac-
tory ratings—as they did in the lead-up to the 2008 crisis. But to 
assign a less-than-satisfactory rating, a firm’s supervisors must 
proactively identify and document serious deficiencies in a firm’s 
condition. In all likelihood, therefore, “false satisfactory” ratings 
are more common than “false unsatisfactory” ratings, alleviating 
concerns about unwarranted divestitures. 
Finally, supervisors need not identify poorly managed firms 
with perfect accuracy for the proposed divestiture framework to 
work. As long as supervisors are reasonably accurate in assign-
ing less-than-satisfactory ratings, the deterrent effect of the di-
vestiture sanction will incentivize FHCs to maintain strong in-
ternal controls and sufficient financial resources.303 The mere 
threat of an unsatisfactory rating will be sufficient for many 
firms to improve their weaknesses, in light of the potential di-
vestiture sanction. Accordingly, even if supervisory ratings do 
not always correlate with a firm’s future performance, reasona-
bly accurate ratings attached to a meaningful divestiture sanc-
tion will help reduce systemic risks and consumer harms. 
E. WILL SUPERVISORS FOLLOW THROUGH? 
Finally, critics might question whether supervisory agencies 
will, in practice, compel a noncompliant FHC to divest. Critics 
have long alleged that the federal banking agencies are too leni-
ent with troubled financial institutions.304 The Federal Reserve’s 
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historic resistance to enforcing section 4(m) supports this 
view.305 Some have attributed this leniency to regulatory cap-
ture,306 others contend that agencies act conservatively to avoid 
litigation risk.307 Thus, even if the Federal Reserve were to adopt 
the proposed divestiture framework, a banking agency might 
forebear from downgrading a firm’s supervisory rating—or 
prematurely upgrade such a rating—to shield an FHC from ad-
verse consequences or to protect the agency from litigation. 
This critique poses a serious challenge to the proposed di-
vestiture framework because section 4(m) relies on supervisors 
to evaluate a firm’s supervisory status in good faith and to follow 
through with a divestiture order if conditions warrant. Policy-
makers, however, could take several steps to alleviate these con-
cerns. For example, Congress could demand that the Federal Re-
serve periodically report on the number of FHCs that fail to 
satisfy the well-capitalized and well-managed requirements, and 
for how long the firms have been out of compliance. This ap-
proach would preserve the traditional confidentiality of an indi-
vidual firm’s supervisory status, while increasing transparency 
into the Federal Reserve’s enforcement practices. Congress could 
investigate, for example, if the banking agencies developed a 
pattern of upgrading an FHC’s supervisory status immediately 
before the two-year deadline when it would have been subject to 
a divestiture order under the section 4(m) framework. 
If enhanced oversight is insufficient to ensure that supervi-
sors follow through with divestitures when appropriate, then 
Congress or the agencies themselves could dramatically enhance 
transparency by mandating publication of individual firms’ su-
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pervisory ratings. As Margaret Tahyar has explained, the statu-
tory basis for the agencies’ assertions of confidentiality over su-
pervisory ratings and examination reports “is less solid than one 
might think.”308 Some commentators have thus called for the 
agencies to release individual firms’ supervisory ratings to in-
crease market discipline on firms in less than satisfactory condi-
tion.309 Publishing supervisory ratings could have the added ben-
efit of disciplining the agencies. With transparent ratings, the 
public could assess whether the agencies declined to downgrade 
a firm, or upgraded its rating too hastily, to avert a section 4(m) 
divestiture. In sum, therefore, while the banking agencies’ reluc-
tance to take significant enforcement actions could impede a sec-
tion 4(m) divestiture regime, increasing transparency in the su-
pervisory process would substantially mitigate this concern. 
  CONCLUSION   
The United States’ largest banking organizations have a 
TBTM problem. Some financial conglomerates are so vast and 
complex that their executives, directors, shareholders, and reg-
ulators are unable to oversee them effectively. Recognizing this 
problem, policymakers have proposed breaking up the biggest fi-
nancial institutions by capping banks’ size, reinstating Glass-
Steagall, or incentivizing a “soft break-up.” In general, however, 
these proposals are neither politically feasible nor conceptually 
satisfying. 
This Article, therefore, has proposed a better way to solve 
banking’s TBTM problem. Compulsory divestitures by firms that 
fail to satisfy regulatory standards would shrink problematic fi-
nancial conglomerates, increase incentives for firms to operate 
prudently, and preserve economies of scale and scope for most 
companies. Importantly, these objectives are achievable without 
new legislation because regulators already have several divesti-
ture authorities under existing law. 
Section 4(m) of the BHC Act is the most promising of these 
divestiture authorities. The Federal Reserve has historically ne-
glected section 4(m), permitting FHCs that are not well capital-
ized or well managed to continue engaging in the full panoply of 
financial activities. By rationalizing its approach, however, the 
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Federal Reserve could mitigate the TBTM problem. Under the 
framework proposed in this Article, financial conglomerates 
could continue engaging in the full range of activities as long as 
they remain well run and financially sound. Firms that are too 
big or complex to comply with these standards, however, would 
be forced to sell, spin-off, or cease operations impermissible for a 
traditional BHC. By adopting this approach, the Federal Re-
serve could finally give meaning to section 4(m) and, in the pro-
cess, solve banking’s TBTM problem. 
 
